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This Article argues that police disciplinary appeals serve as an underappreciated
barrier to oﬃcer accountability and organizational reform. Scholars and experts
generally agree that rigorous enforcement of internal regulations within a police
department promotes constitutional policing by deterring future misconduct and
removing unfit oﬃcers from the streets. In recent years, though, a troubling pattern
has emerged. Because of internal appeals procedures, police departments must often
rehire or significantly reduce disciplinary sanctions against oﬃcers who have engaged
in serious misconduct. Little legal research has comprehensively examined the appeals
process available to oﬃcers facing disciplinary sanctions.
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By drawing on a national dataset of police union contracts, this Article analyzes
the disciplinary appeals process utilized in a substantial cross section of large and
midsized American police departments. It shows that the majority of these
departments give police officers the ability to appeal disciplinary sanctions through
multiple levels of appellate review. At the end of this process, many departments
allow officers to appeal disciplinary sanctions to an arbitrator selected, in part, by
the local police union or the aggrieved officer. Most jurisdictions give these
arbitrators expansive authority to reconsider factual and legal decisions related to
the disciplinary matter. And police departments frequently ban members of the
public from watching or participating in these appellate hearings. While each of these
appellate procedures may be individually defensible, they may theoretically combine
in many police departments to create a formidable barrier to officer accountability.
This Article concludes by considering the implications of these findings for the
literature on police reform.
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INTRODUCTION
In August of 2015, an officer with the San Antonio Police Department
(SAPD) reported to the scene of an apparent shooting in the city’s South
Side neighborhood.1 While collecting evidence, the officer encountered
forty-eight–year-old neighborhood resident Elroy Leal, who pointed out
several bullet casings that the officer had missed during his inspection of
the crime scene.2 The situation quickly escalated,3 and moments later, the
officer placed Mr. Leal under arrest.4
At this point, a dash camera captured video and audio of a disturbing series
of events, as Mr. Leal sat handcuffed in the back of the officer’s squad car.5
Throughout the seventeen minutes of video released by the SAPD, the officer
appeared to verbally berate Mr. Leal,6 describing him as a “trashy human
being,”7 mocking his intelligence,8 and labeling him as “disrespectful.”9 When
1 Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers Fired for
Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired [https://perma.cc/S4YE-4Y4Y] (describing the San Antonio
incident, along with a number of other similar incidents where police officers were eventually
rehired through the appeals process after termination); Mark D. Wilson, Video: SAPD Oﬃcer
Suspended After Challenging Arrestee to Fight, Removing Handcuﬀs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/crime/article/VIDEO-SAPD-officer-agreed-to-fightman-during-7973241.php [https://perma.cc/ZD7D-LKEM] (last updated June 10, 2016) (stating
that the event took place in the South Side neighborhood of San Antonio, at 5 a.m. in the 3100
block of Cahmita Street).
2 According to Mr. Leal, this oﬃcer became upset after he said: “Hey cop, can I walk through
here? Hey, some investigation you guys did.” Michael Barajas, San Antonio Cop Arrests, Berates and
Threatens to Fight Man for Being “Disrespectful,” SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (June 9, 2016, 8:30 AM),
https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2016/06/09/san-antonio-cop-arrests-berates-andthreatens-to-ﬁght-man-for-being-disrespectful [https://perma.cc/P94A-NFK8].
3 The facts on how the situation escalated remain somewhat unclear. But the statements made by
the officer (and recorded by the dash camera video after the arrest) give us some idea. At one point the
officer told Mr. Leal, “Who doesn’t make mistakes? Everyone makes mistakes at their job . . . . You did
not call me officer. You have never called me officer until I said listen, shut the fuck up and get in the
car . . . . The way you addressed me was incredibly disrespectful . . . . I would never talk to anybody
like that. That’s why you’re going to jail and I’m not. And you had the chance to run, to fight, whatever,
but you didn’t. Because not only are you stupid, you’re a coward.” Id.
4 E.g. Tim Gerber, City Releases Video of SAPD Officer Agreeing to Fight Suspect, Removing
His Handcuffs, ABC KSAT 12 NEWS (June 7, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://www.ksat.com/news/
defenders/city-releases-video-of-sapd-officer-agreeing-to-fight-suspect-removing-his-handcuffs
[https://perma.cc/TQ8E-VUHP] (“[The oﬃcer] had arrested Leal last August for interfering with the
duties of a public servant at the scene of a shooting.”).
5 See id. (providing a link to a YouTube video of the dash camera footage).
6 In addition to the comments discussed elsewhere in this summary, supra note 3, the oﬃcer
also called Mr. Leal a “sorry human being.” Barajas, supra note 2.
7 Barajas, supra note 2.
8 When Mr. Leal said he would like to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, the oﬃcer
responded that, “You wouldn’t even know what the Fifth Amendment is . . . . You don’t know
anything about history. I doubt you even have a high school diploma.” Id.
9 Id.
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Mr. Leal asked why he was under arrest, the officer replied that he would
“think of something.”10 But perhaps most disturbing of all, as Mr. Leal sat
handcuffed in the back of the squad car, the officer challenged Mr. Leal to a
fistfight for the chance to be released.11
The dash camera video understandably shocked police supervisors and
officials in the district attorney’s office.12 Soon thereafter, the SAPD moved
to fire the officer involved in Mr. Leal’s unlawful arrest.13 But before the
SAPD could finalize the firing, Texas law and the San Antonio police union
contract provide officers with the right to appeal disciplinary decisions to a
“qualified, neutral arbitrator.14 Arbitrators, selected in part by the officer
under investigation,15 have the power to review the factual and legal
justification for disciplinary actions taken against an officer.16 And a
decision handed down by such an arbitrator is binding, effectively

10 Wilson, supra note 1 (quoting the oﬃcer from the video evidence as responding to Mr. Leal’s
question by saying, “I’ll think of something. How about public intoxication, pedestrian in a roadway?
Whatever else I can think of.”).
11 The oﬃcer actually went to the back of the squad car and took oﬀ Mr. Leal’s handcuﬀs,
seemingly in hopes of engaging in a ﬁstﬁght. The oﬃcer promised that he would “beat [Mr. Leal’s]
ass.” Kelly et al., supra note 1.
12 See id. (describing how in December of 2015, Bexar County prosecutors uncovered the video
as they were reviewing the details of the arrest, and also describing how San Antonio eventually
made the video public after facing community pressure).
13 Officer to be Fired for Challenging Man to Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 11, 2016, 10:23 AM),
https://www.abqjournal.com/790351/officer-to-be-fired-for-challenging-arrested-man-to-fight.html
[https://perma.cc/YM74-P8RX] (noting that the SAPD gave Officer Belver an indefinite
suspension for violating departmental policies). Section 143.052 of the Texas Local Government
Code, which governs disciplinary suspensions in communities like San Antonio, describes an
“indefinite suspension” as “equivalent to dismissal from the department.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 143.052(b) (2017).
14 TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(d) (2017). Texas Local Government Code
Section 143.053 deals with appeals of disciplinary suspensions for communities with a population
under 1.5 million, providing oﬃcers with the ability to appeal suspensions to the civil service
commission. But under Texas Local Government Code Section 143.057, police oﬃcers have the
option to waive the right to appeal to the civil service commission, and instead appeal to an
“independent third party hearing examiner” deﬁned as a “qualiﬁed neutral arbitrator.” See
also Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of San Antonio and the San Antonio Police
Oﬃcers’ Association, at 73-80 (Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter San Antonio Collective Bargaining
Agreement] (on ﬁle with author).
15 T EX. L OCAL G OV’T C ODE A NN. § 143.057(d) (2017) (noting that the officer and the
police supervisor may each alternately strike names of potential arbitrators from a panel of
seven arbitrators provided by the American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service). San Antonio Collective Bargaining agreement, supra note 14, at 75.
16 Section 143.057(d) appears to provide no explicit limitation on the arbitrator’s authority to
re-evaluate the factual and legal grounding for a supervisor’s disciplinary decision. The union
contract requires the SAPD to prove its case on appeal by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 76.
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overruling any decisions made by a police chief, mayor, city council, or
civilian review board.17
This particular oﬃcer was no stranger to the disciplinary appeals process.
Six years earlier, he stood accused of number of serious incidents of
misconduct, including a suspiciously similar allegation that he challenged a
diﬀerent man to a ﬁstﬁght after a drunk driving arrest.18 In that case, the
SAPD also attempted to ﬁre the oﬃcer, only to have an arbitrator on appeal
reduce his termination to a mere thirty-day suspension.19
But this time seemed diﬀerent. The entire exchange between Mr. Leal
and the oﬃcer was caught on video, leaving no doubt about the facts in this
case. And since this was the second time that this oﬃcer had apparently
challenged a suspect in custody to a ﬁght, it raised even more serious concerns
about his temperament and judgment. However, an arbitrator again ordered
the SAPD to rehire the oﬃcer.20
Stories like this should worry police reform advocates. Scholars and
experts generally agree that to promote the protection of constitutional
rights, police supervisors must consistently investigate and respond to
officer misconduct. Theoretically, rigorous enforcement of departmental
regulations deters future misconduct and removes unfit officers from the
streets.21 But in recent years, various media outlets have observed a troubling
17 TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(c) (2017) (“The hearing examiner’s decision is
ﬁnal and binding on all parties. If the . . . police oﬃcer decides to appeal to an independent third
party hearing examiner, the person automatically waives all rights to appeal to a district court . . . .”).
18 The victim in the earlier case claimed that this oﬃcer promised to let him go if he could
“kick his [a—].” Kelly et al., supra note 1. Additionally, “[b]y the time Flores reached the police
detention center, he had a bruised left eye, injuries to his back and neck, and a large bruise across
his face . . . .” Id. In addition, the SAPD found that the oﬃcer assaulted a diﬀerent man after
entering the man’s home without a warrant. Id.
19 Id. After the department was forced to rehire the oﬃcer, it made him sign a “last chance
agreement” that premised his future employment on no future misconduct and limited his ability
to patrol the streets alone. Id.
20 More speciﬁcally, the arbitrator found that, under the terms of the San Antonio police union
contract, supervisors could not consider his past misconduct in their decision to terminate him, since
it had taken place over 180 days earlier. Id. This, according to the police union and the arbitrator,
made the “last chance agreement” eﬀectively null and void. Id. As a result, the arbitrator concluded
that the city could only consider the immediate circumstances of the behavior in question, making
termination an unreasonably harsh punishment. Id.; see also Tim Gerber, SAPD Oﬃcer Appeals
Termination, Wins Job Back Through Arbitration, ABC KSAT 12 NEWS (April 27, 2017, 9:47 PM),
https://www.ksat.com/news/defenders/sapd-officer-appeals-termination-wins-job-back-through-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/D2HY-KVBH] (elaborating on the rehiring and providing a link to the decision
handed down by the arbitrator).
21 As Judge Thelton Henderson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California observed, “[j]ust like any failure to impose appropriate discipline by the [police] chief or
city administrator, any reversal of appropriate discipline [during the appeals process] undermines
the very objectives of [the reform program].” Matthew Artz, Judge Orders Investigation into
Oakland’s Police Arbitration Losses, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:38 PM),
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pattern. Because of internal appeals procedures, police departments must
often rehire or significantly reduce disciplinary sanctions against officers
that have committed egregious acts of misconduct.22 The story from San
Antonio is hardly unique.
The media has documented similar stories in police departments across
the country. For example, in 2007 an Oakland police oﬃcer shot and killed an
unarmed twenty-year-old man.23 Only a few months later, the same oﬃcer
“killed another unarmed man, shooting him three times in the back as he ran
away.”24 Oakland paid a $650,000 settlement to the family of the deceased
man and ﬁred the oﬃcer.25 But during the disciplinary appeals process, an
arbitrator ordered Oakland to reinstate the oﬃcer and awarded him back
pay.26 Similarly, an arbitrator overruled a decision by the police department
in Sarasota, Florida to ﬁre an oﬃcer who misled investigators after being
caught on camera repeatedly and excessively beating a suspect without
justiﬁcation.27 And in Washington, D.C., police oﬃcials ﬁred an oﬃcer after
his criminal conviction for sexually abusing a teenager in his squad car, only
to have an arbitrator order him rehired on appeal.28
In each of these cases and hundreds of others like them across the
country,29 police disciplinary appeals have forced communities to rehire
http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/08/14/judge-orders-investigation-into-oaklands-police-arbitration-losses
[https://perma.cc/UHB8-UHG2]. These comments came after reports emerged that the police
union was successful in reducing or overturning punishment against officers in twelve of the
previous fifteen cases.
22 See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 1 (showing that in a survey of large American police
departments, approximately twenty-three percent of oﬃcers won their jobs back through appeals
after being terminated for misconduct).
23 Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Streets,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unionskeep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258 [https://perma.cc/TJG9-J3YS].
24 Id. (emphasis added); see also Sean Maher, Early Report Shows Oakland Police Shot Man
in Back, E. BAY TIMES (July 28, 2008, 4:56 PM), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2008/07/28/
early-report-shows-oakland-police-shot-man-in-back [https://perma.cc/S48S-PEQP].
25 Henry K. Lee, Fatal Shooting to Cost Oakland $650,000, S.F. GATE (July 8, 2009, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Fatal-police-shooting-to-cost-Oakland-650-000-3224969.php
[https://perma.cc/8AU7-72CN].
26 Henry K. Lee, Oakland Must Rehire Cop Who Shot Suspect in Back, S.F. GATE (March 5, 2011, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-must-rehire-cop-who-shot-suspect-in-back-2528215.php
[https://perma.cc/L9UK-S3WQ]; Sean Maher, Oakland Police Officer to Be Reinstated, MERCURY NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/03/06/oakland-police-officer-to-be-reinstated
[https://perma.cc/8SGB-CGH5].
27 See Friedersdorf, supra note 23 (describing the incidence and additionally noting that after
the incident, the oﬃcer told investigators that he “should have killed him”).
28 See Kelly et al., supra note 1 (discussing the ﬁring, the subsequent order to rehire, and the
eﬀorts by the city to keep the oﬃcer, Michael Blaise Sugg-Edwards, out of the department).
29 For example, in Portland, Oregon, an arbitrator ordered the rehiring of a police oﬃcer who
had allegedly unjustiﬁably killed an unarmed twenty-ﬁve-year-old. See Everton Bailey Jr., Portland
Must Rehire Cop Fired After Killing Unarmed Man in 2010, Court Rules, OREGONIAN (Dec. 31, 2015),
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police oﬃcers deemed unﬁt for duty by their supervisors. But to date, there
have been few comprehensive academic studies analyzing the disciplinary
appeals procedures that contribute to these problematic outcomes.
This is in part because police disciplinary appeals vary from one
jurisdiction to another.30 These procedures are often articulated not just in
state statutes or municipal codes, but also in department-speciﬁc police union
contracts. Given that there are thousands of decentralized police departments
in the United States,31 each with their own municipal codes, internal policies,
and union contracts,32 the content of police disciplinary appeals procedures
has largely escaped scholarly inquiry.
To begin ﬁlling this gap in the literature, this Article analyzes disciplinary
appeals procedures across a large number of American police departments. It
draws on a dataset of 656 police union contracts collected via open record
requests, searches of municipal websites, state repositories, and the web.33
This dataset provides a detailed account of the disciplinary appeals process
available to a large number of American police officers working at the state and
local level.34 The vast majority of these police departments give officers the
ability to appeal disciplinary sanctions through multiple levels of appellate
review.35 At the end of this complex process, the majority of departments permit
officers to appeal disciplinary sanctions to an arbitrator selected in part by the
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2015/12/portland_must_rehire_cop_fired.html
[https://perma.cc/9XV4-SQZM] (explaining that the Oregon Court of Appeals ultimately
reaﬃrmed an arbitrator and state board’s order to reinstate the oﬃcer). And in New London,
Connecticut, an arbitrator ordered the rehiring of a police oﬃcer who shot and paralyzed an
unarmed man. Connecticut Town Rehires Oﬃcer Who Shot Unarmed Man, NEW HAVEN REG., (Mar.
18, 2014, 8:16 AM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Connecticut-town-rehiresoﬃcer-who-shot-unarmed-11367888.php [https://perma.cc/Z3SL-BVRD]. In 2008, the Pittsburgh
Bureau of Police ﬁred an oﬃcer for “accidentally shooting a 20-year-old man he was trying to pistol
whip” at the oﬃcer’s wife’s birthday party, only to have an arbitrator order the bureau to rehire him.
Friedersdorf, supra note 23.
30 See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1258-66 (2017) (showing that some
police departments’ collective bargaining agreements “provide[] for arbitration” and others do not).
31 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22VR-UCZ9] (estimating that there are around 17,985 police and law enforcement
agencies in the United States).
32 The majority of police oﬃcers are part of labor unions that collectively negotiate their own
contracts with their local police department. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (rev. ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8G6-ULEG] (noting that about two-thirds of police oﬃcers are part of
departments that authorize collective bargaining).
33 See infra Part III (describing in more detail the methodology for this project). This dataset
builds on the work of prior researchers.
34 See infra Part III.
35 See infra Section IV.A (ﬁnding that approximately seventy-three percent of police
departments studied used some form of outside arbitrators in the disciplinary appeals process).
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local police union.36 And in virtually all of these cases, police departments give
arbitrators significant authority to re-litigate the factual and legal grounds for
disciplinary action.37 While each of these appellate procedures may be
individually defensible, they could theoretically combine in a large number of
police departments to create a formidable barrier to accountability.
This hypothesis has several important implications for the literature on
police accountability. First, these findings demonstrate that, in most
American police departments, police supervisors, city councils, mayors,
and civilian review boards are often not the true adjudicators of internal
discipline. The final authority on disciplinary actions frequently rests with
outside arbitrators or third parties.38 This suggests that the average
American police officer faces even less democratic accountability than
many scholars have previously assumed.
Second, the complexity and formidability of the disciplinary appeals
process may explain the inability of traditional external legal mechanisms to
promote reform in American police departments.39 In many documented
cases, supervisors have been forced to rehire oﬃcers that have engaged in
criminal oﬀenses, violence, and other behaviors that raise serious questions
about their ﬁtness to serve in any law enforcement capacity.40 Sometimes, the
oﬀenses committed by rehired oﬃcers raise serious enough concerns about
an oﬃcer’s proclivity towards dishonesty that prosecutors are required to
place the oﬃcer on a Brady list41 and reassign them so as to avoid impairing
future criminal prosecutions. This suggests that supervisors may be limited
in their ability to bring about important personnel changes that could remedy
patterns of misconduct within a police department.

36 See infra Section IV.B (ﬁnding that ﬁfty-four percent of police departments studied allow
unions signiﬁcant authority in choosing the arbitrators who will hear disciplinary appeals).
37 See infra Section IV.C (ﬁnding that around seventy percent of departments studied gave
arbitrators authority to conduct “expansive” or “de novo” review of disciplinary determinations).
38 See, e.g., Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee
Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1039-43, 1047-48, 1052 (2016) (providing an excellent and
detailed summary of civilian review models across a large number of American cities, but
spending somewhat less time considering how disciplinary appeals may make civilian review
more symbolic than substantive).
39 See infra Section IV.E (describing the implications of these ﬁndings for the eﬀectiveness of
the exclusionary rule, civil litigation, criminal prosecution, civilian review boards, and structural
reform litigation as regulatory mechanisms).
40 See generally Friedersdorf, supra note 23 (providing numerous, detailed examples of
officers who were removed from police forces following internal investigations or criminal
prosecutions and subsequently reinstated following arbitration); Kelly et al., supra note 1
(providing even more examples of the same).
41 See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and
the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 749-51, 762-79 (2015) (describing the
requirements imparted by Brady and how they interact with records of oﬃcer misconduct).
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Based on these ﬁndings, this Article oﬀers some preliminary thoughts on
how communities could reform the police disciplinary appeal process. For
one thing, states and localities could increase democratic accountability in
police disciplinary appeals. To be clear, police oﬃcers deserve procedural
protections to avoid arbitrary punishment. However, in many police
departments across the country, disciplinary procedures seem as if they are
designed to insulate oﬃcers from democratic oversight. Thus, to the extent
that communities want to promote democratic oversight of police behavior,
policymakers could replace arbitrators with democratically accountable
actors.42 A number of police departments already do this, by providing
oﬃcers with an opportunity to appeal discipline levied by a police supervisor
to civilian review boards, city councils, mayors, or city managers.43
Nevertheless, many police oﬃcers and union leaders may understandably
argue that appellate procedures are designed to provide a check on the
discretionary authority of democratic actors.44 A city council member, mayor,
civilian review board, or city manager may not be suﬃciently detached from
police department supervisors so as to make an impartial decision on an
internal disciplinary matter. By contrast, police unions may argue that
arbitrators are truly neutral and disinterested parties, and thus well situated
to adjudicate disciplinary appeals.
Thus, if communities continue using appellate procedures like
arbitration in cases of disciplinary appeals, this Article proposes several
steps that communities could take to balance the need for impartiality and
with the community interest in democratic accountability. For example,
communities could follow the lead of cities like Grand Rapids, Michigan,
and Fullerton, California, in giving arbitrators narrower standards of
42 See infra Section V.A (proposing that appellate review authority be vested in actors like city
councils, mayors, city managers, or civilian review boards).
43 For example, in Murrieta, California, oﬃcers have the ability to appeal punishment handed
down by the police chief to the City Manager. The City Manager must then hold a hearing, where
he or she determines whether the punishment is supported by evidence. While employees can
challenge the City Manager’s decision to advisory arbitration, the arbitrator’s decision is not binding
on the city. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Murrieta and the Murrieta
Police Oﬃcers Association 5-10 (2007) (on ﬁle with author) [hereinafter City of Murrieta]. Other
cities allow for officers to appeal disciplinary decisions to an arbitrator, but they make these arbitrators’
decisions advisory. In such cases they often give power to the City Manager, or a similar actor, to
determine the final disposition. See, e.g., City of Oxnard, Memorandum of Understanding Between
City of Oxnard and Oxnard Peace Officers’ Association 21-23 (2016), https://www.oxnard.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/OPOA-MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/26EC-6AQP] (giving the City
Manager authority to depart from the “advisory recommendation of the arbitrator,” including to
impose “new and more severe discipline”).
44 Cf. Ofer, supra note 38, at 1050 (“Police officers who are accused of wrongdoing must be
fully protected from false accusations and must enjoy the full range of due process protections in
all stages of the investigatory and disciplinary process, including . . . the right to appeal the
substantiation or the discipline.”).
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review,45 or limiting their ability to reduce punishment if the evidence
supports the alleged violation.46 Such a move would provide more deference
to disciplinary decisions made by democratically accountable
representatives of the community, while still empowering theoretically
disinterested third parties like arbitrators to provide relief in cases of truly
arbitrary or capricious punishment.
This Article proceeds in ﬁve parts. Part I provides background
information on the sources of internal disciplinary procedures, including
appellate procedures, in American police departments. It focuses speciﬁcally
on police union contracts, civil service laws, and law enforcement oﬃcer bills
of rights as the primary sources of these appellate procedures. Part II reviews
the limited existing empirical literature on police disciplinary appeals. Part
III lays out the methodology, and Part IV presents the results of this study.
Finally, Part V oﬀers some normative recommendations for increasing
democratic accountability and transparency in police disciplinary appeals.
I. THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINARY PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLICE
DEPARTMENTS
Modern policing scholars widely recognize that individual acts of
officer misconduct are often symptoms of broader organizational
deficiencies within law enforcement agencies.47 Thus, in order to address
police misconduct effectively, the law must not only punish “bad apples,”48
but also incentivize the nation’s roughly 18,000 state and local police

45 For example, the Grand Rapids contract states that an arbitrator “shall be limited to a
determination of the facts only and shall have no authority to modify the discipline imposed if the
facts support the violation.” This effectively means that the arbitrator can review the factual
sufficiency of the allegations against an officer, but the arbitrator cannot exercise their own
personal judgment about the proper punishment. Agreement Between City of Grand Rapids and
the Grand Rapids Police Officer Association, Office and Sergeant Unit 6 (2016),
https://www.grandrapidsmi.gov/files/assets/public/departments/administrative-services/files/labor-unioncontracts/police-officers-and-sergeants-contract-070116-063019.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7LL-AYCG].
46 The Fullerton contract says that an arbitration may not overrule, reverse, or modify a city’s
decision unless in the arbitrator ﬁnds the city has violated the terms of the contract, or if the city’s
decision is “arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable.” Agreement Between
the City of Fullerton and the Fullerton Police Oﬃcers Association Police Safety Unit 45 (2015),
https://www.cityoffullerton.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=23642 [https://perma.cc/BRT6B22Y] [hereinafter City of Fullerton].
47 See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 G EO .
W ASH. L. R EV. 453, 493-514 (2004) (arguing that police misconduct is caused in part by
organizational deficiencies).
48 See Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 135 (2016)
(“After all, every large organization will have a few bad apples. In the absence of any national
statistics on local behavior, it can be diﬃcult . . . to prove that an individual act of police misconduct
is connected to a broader problem within a police department.”).
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departments49 to implement rigorous internal oversight and disciplinary
procedures. The law primarily relies on a handful of external, legal
mechanisms50 to do this: the exclusionary rule,51 criminal prosecution,52 and
Reaves, supra note 31.
This list, of course, leaves off other major forms of police regulation like structural reform
litigation and state licensing or accreditation, which have received some scholarly discussion—although
less so than the exclusionary rule, criminal prosecution, and civil litigation. See, e.g., Roger L. Goldman
& Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Oﬃcer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 546 (2001) (“Without a mechanism at the state or national level to remove the
certiﬁcate of law enforcement oﬃcials who engage in such misconduct, it is likely that there will be
more such instances of repeated misconduct.”). See generally, Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of
Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2008) (arguing for a more collaborative approach to § 14141
enforcement); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1417 (2000) (oﬀering a normative
recommendation for improving the DOJ’s use of § 14141 litigation); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting
Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (oﬀering normative
recommendations for improving the DOJ’s implementation of § 14141); Stephen Rushin, Federal
Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3193 (2014) [hereinafter Rushin, Federal
Enforcement] (assessing § 14141 implementation empirically); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform
Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin,
Structural Reform Litigation] (providing an empirical assessment of the use of the DOJ’s
implementation of § 14141).
51 The exclusionary rule prohibits prosecutors from admitting evidence in criminal trials in
state and federal courts obtained by police in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (expanding the exclusionary rule to cover wrongdoing by state and local
police, not just federal law enforcement); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
390-92 (1920) (extending the exclusionary rule to address both illegally obtained material and copies
of illegally obtained material, establishing the groundwork for the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule at the
federal level, but not applying it to the states), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Theoretically, the exclusionary rule deters officer misconduct by removing the incentive for
such behavior. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The rule is calculated to prevent,
not to repair. Its purpose is to deter . . . by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). However,
there is debate about whether the exclusionary rule contributes to meaningful change in police
departments. Compare William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 311, 359 (1991) (arguing that, with sufficient institutional support, the exclusion rule can
stand as a significant deterrent against police misconduct), and Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1016, 1017 (1987) (finding that the Chicago Police Department underwent some reforms after
implementation of exclusionary rule), with GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 322-23 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing the exclusionary rule is
ineffective at bringing about real change).
52 Police oﬃcers can be subject to criminal prosecution at the state or federal level. At the
federal level, under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012), police oﬃcers can be subject to criminal prosecution if
their conduct willfully deprives someone of their constitutional rights. At the state level, prosecutors
can bring charges against police oﬃcers for any criminal law violation, subject to the usual
protections aﬀorded to criminal suspects, including criminal defenses like self-defense. Scholars
recognize that only a small subset of police misconduct constitute criminal acts, making it an
underinclusive method for addressing the wide range of oﬃcer misconduct. See Debra Livingston,
Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815,
49
50
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civil litigation.53 Each of these mechanisms penalizes individual acts of
unlawful behavior by frontline police officers, which in the aggregate should
theoretically force rational police supervisors to enact rigorous internal
oversight and disciplinary procedures within their police agencies.54
But for decades, researchers have lamented the apparent failure of these
external mechanisms to usher in the desired organizational reform. Scholars
have offered a wide range of explanations for the failure of these mechanisms.
Some have argued that, because of the organization of municipal governments,
police departments fail to internalize the costs imposed by civil judgments.55
Others have pointed out that courts have established dozens of exceptions to
the exclusionary rule, making it less effective at discouraging officer

842 n.138 (1999) (“[C]riminal law standards deﬁne ‘the outer limits of what is permissible in
society’—not the good police practices that police reformers aspire to institute in a wayward
department.” (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 101 (1995))).
53 Victims of police misconduct can ﬁle civil suit in federal district court, if the oﬃcer’s conduct
violated their constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). But in order to be successful, individuals
must overcome the qualiﬁed immunity doctrine, wherein government actors are exempt from civil
liability unless they are violating a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[].” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002) (deﬁning
what makes a right clearly established); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-18 (1999) (providing a
clearer deﬁnition of when a right is clearly established); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-08 (1982) (limiting
the availability of civil suit in cases where a public oﬃcial is protected by qualiﬁed immunity).
Individuals can also ﬁle suit against a police department or municipality, but only if they can show
that the oﬃcer’s conduct was caused by the employer’s deliberate indiﬀerence in its failure to train
or oversee its employee. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) (establishing the deliberate
indiﬀerence in a failure to train as the standard for municipal liability); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (upholding municipal liability for § 1983 claims in
some cases). Some research suggests § 1983 may bring about reform in police departments. See,
e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 95 (2009) (showing that insurance companies pushed
reform in police departments in response to the expansion of municipal liability). Nevertheless,
indemnification policies in municipalities seem to undermine many of the fundamental
assumptions underlying the court’s doctrine on § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (showing the prevalence of indemnification
policies across American police departments).
54 In my previous research, I have described each of these existing responses to police
misconduct as “cost-raising” regulations. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 50, at
1352 (“That is to say, these traditional approaches attempt to dissuade police wrongdoing by
raising the potential costs of such behavior. They cannot force police departments to adopt
proactive reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.”).
55 See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 495
(2009) (showing how the organization of municipal governments often means that municipalities
do not properly internalize the consequences of police misconduct). See generally Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 144 (2016)
(providing a detailed empirical assessment of how many communities pay for the costs of police
officer misconduct and finding that budgetary arrangements often lessen the impact of these
lawsuits on police agencies).
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wrongdoing.56 And still others have recognized that, for a number of practical
and structural reasons, officers are rarely subject to criminal punishment.57
An emerging thread of scholarship has shown that police supervisors face
another signiﬁcant hurdle in responding to oﬃcer misconduct: a complex web
of labor and employment laws that deﬁne the procedural requirements police
supervisors must follow when investigating or punishing oﬃcers for
misconduct.58 These labor and employment protections come from several
sources: police union contracts, law enforcement officer bills of rights, and
civil service statutes. These three sources also frequently articulate the
procedures used by police officers appealing internal disciplinary action. The
following sections will address each in turn, while focusing specifically on
how these mechanisms establish the disciplinary appeals process in
American police departments.
A. Police Union Contracts
Police oﬃcers are a relatively “new addition to the labor movement.”59 For
much of American history, police oﬃcers did not have the legal right to
unionize, in part because of the “disastrous Boston Police Department Strike
of 1919, in which over a thousand oﬃcers—about two-thirds of Boston’s police
force at the time—made a bid for higher pay and better hours by walking oﬀ
the job or refusing to report for duty,” leading to riots, property damage, and

56 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504-27 (1996) (detailing how the Supreme Court
has gradually recognized numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule); see also United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (establishing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule);
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984) (establishing the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960) (striking down the silver platter
doctrine); Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 183 (2012) (explaining
how the exclusionary rule only applies to public law enforcement, and not private police agents).
57 For example, of the thousands of cases of police oﬃcers killing civilians from 2005 through
2015, the Washington Post only found evidence that ﬁfty-four oﬃcers were charged for any crimes.
Kimbriell Kelly & Kimberly Kindy, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted
[https://perma.cc/KH47-EC66].
58 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012) (describing
collective bargaining as a sort of “tax” on police reform); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental
Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205-17 (2014) (discussing how labor laws and collective
bargaining agreements can “frustrate attempts to discipline individual oﬃcers” by “giv[ing] line
oﬃcers more authority to deﬁne the police role”).
59 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1203.
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numerous deaths.60 It would be decades after the Boston riots before police
began, in earnest, to win the right to unionize and collectively bargain.61
Today, the tide has turned dramatically. The majority of police oﬃcers are
part of police unions,62 and police unionization has strong supporters on both
sides of the political aisle.63 State statutes on the topic generally permit police
oﬃcers to bargain collectively on any matter related to wages, hours, and
other conditions of employment. Terms like “wages” and “hours” give police
unions the right to negotiate about anything that aﬀects compensation or
beneﬁts, either directly or indirectly.64 Terms like “conditions of
employment” present some interpretive complexity. If read broadly, this sort
of language can become a “catchall phrase into which almost any proposal may
fall.”65 To prevent such a broad interpretation, courts and state labor relations
boards have found that so-called managerial prerogatives are not subject to
collective bargaining as conditions of employment.66 For all practical
purposes, though, courts have held that many disciplinary procedures qualify
as conditions of employment rather than managerial prerogatives.67
60 Stoughton, supra note 58, at 2206; see also JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS:
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE: 1900–1962, at 14 (2004)
(chronicling how these events led to court opinions, labor opponents, and policymakers frequently
citing the Boston strike “as a cautionary tale of the evils of such [police] unions”).
61 Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 736 (2017)
(“Unions finally succeeded in gaining a lasting foothold in American police departments in the late
1960s, as rank-and-file officers felt attacked by the civil rights movement’s focus on police brutality and
racism and by federal court decisions limiting police officers’ investigatory and arrest powers.”).
62 According to one estimate, there are ﬁve states that explicitly bar police unionization under
state law: Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennesse, and Virginia. MILLA SANES & JOHN
SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 4-5 (2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LVN-RD9V]. Four states have no clear statutory mandate on the
topic: Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming. Id. The remaining states either permit or
require collective bargaining in police departments. Id. This means that, according to one estimate,
around sixty-six percent of police oﬃcers are employed by departments that engage in collective
bargaining. REAVES, supra note 32, at 13.
63 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1206 (“[P]olitical leaders on both sides of the aisle who once rejected
police unionization as a threat to public safety have now widely embraced it.”).
64 Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public Employment
Relations, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3, at 242, 249-50 (1978) (showing that courts have generally
understood terms like “wages” to permit public employees to bargain about wages or salaries, fringe
benefits, health insurance, life insurance, retirement benefits, sick leave, vacation time, and other
forms of indirect compensation).
65 Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex. App. 1999).
66 See Tussey, supra note 64, at 249.
67 See, e.g., City of Casselberry v. Orange Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 482 So. 2d 336, 33738, 340-41 (Fla. 1986) (concluding that municipalities must bargain collectively on issues of
discharge and demotion as needed to provide alternative grievance procedures); City of Reno v.
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 653 P.2d 156, 158 (Nev. 1982) (upholding state labor relations agency’s
determination that a city must negotiate in good faith with a police department over disciplinary
procedures); Union Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No. 112, 766
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Some research has explored the ways that the collective bargaining
process may contribute to internal policies and procedures that thwart police
accountability eﬀorts.68 These studies have found that police union contracts
frequently include language that impedes oﬃcer investigation and oversight
by delaying oﬃcer interrogations,69 limiting civilian oversight,70 expunging
records of prior oﬃcer misconduct,71 and more.72 At least one study has
N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 1034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the department must bargain
collectively over disciplinary procedures); but c.f. Berkeley Police Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a policy allowing members of a citizen review
board to meet and confer with the police union any time a new civil oversight mechanism was
being implemented constituted a “management level decision[] . . . not properly within the scope
of union representation and collective bargaining”); Local 346, Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v.
Labor Relations Comm’n, 462 N.E.2d 96, 101-03 (Mass. 1984) (determining that use of a polygraph
was not a condition of employment because of overriding policy interest in officer accountability);
State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n, 634 A.2d 478, 493 (N.J. 1993) (limiting the applicability to
police unions of a statutory requirement that governments and public employee unions engage in
collective bargaining over certain disciplinary procedures).
68 See generally DERAY MCKESSON ET AL., CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE UNION CONTRACTS
AND POLICE BILL OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdfe28a1f0/1467217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Unio
n+Contract+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5U3-GB3V] (analyzing the contents of police union
contracts from eighty-one large American cities to show how some provisions may thwart
accountability efforts); Fisk & Richardson, supra note 61 (providing a summary of how police
unions can both thwart and promote accountability, and of the ways that police union contracts
can impair reasonable accountability efforts); Rushin, supra note 30 (providing an analysis of labor
laws that influence police internal disciplinary procedures, analyzing a dataset of 178 police union
contracts, and offering normative recommendations on how to reform the law to diminish the
number of barriers to accountability).
69 See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, at 6 (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.chicago.gov/content/
dam/city/depts/dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA2012-2017_2.20.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U339-Z865] [hereinafter City of Chicago] (providing a minimum forty-eight
hour waiting period from the time an officer is informed of a request for an interview in relation
to a disciplinary investigation, with some exceptions for particular circumstances).
70 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Baltimore City Police Department
and the Baltimore City Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. Unit I, at 22 (Jan. 21, 2015) (on
ﬁle with author) (barring civilian participation on certain disciplinary hearing boards).
71 See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Cleveland and the Cleveland
Police Patrolmen’s Association Non-Civilian Personnel, at 7 (Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Cleveland
Collective Bargaining Agreement] (on ﬁle with author) (requiring the removal of verbal and written
reprimands of oﬃcers after six months, and mandating that “all other disciplinary actions or
penalties . . . be removed after two years from the date the discipline was administered”).
72 See generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT AND THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY (2015), http://
samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/BALTIMORE-POLICE-UNION-CONTRACTFinal.pdf
(describing how the law enforcement officer bill of rights in Maryland and the Baltimore police union
contract can impede accountability); SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE UNION CONTRACT “WAITING
PERIODS” FOR MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2015),
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf (rejecting the need for
waiting periods in cases of officer interrogations); Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts
Shield Officers From Scrutiny and Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:16 PM GMT),
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speculated that the structure of the collective bargaining process and the
political power of police unions may be contributing to regulatory capture,
whereby police unions are able to obtain unreasonably generous protections
from disciplinary oversight.73 And a compelling new study by Professors
Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams, and John Rappaport has
found that the introduction of collective bargaining to sheriﬀs’ departments
in Florida corresponded with a statistically signiﬁcant uptick in misconduct
complaints.74 In response, some scholars have argued for more transparency
in the collective bargaining process,75 while others support the inclusion of
minority unions during negotiations.76 Overall, the existing literature seems
to suggest that police union contracts may make it more diﬃcult to bring
about reform in problematic police departments.77
Despite the growing scholarship on police unions and collective
bargaining, the existing literature has given little attention to the topic of
disciplinary appeals. One study observed that police union contracts
frequently require the arbitration of disciplinary appeals.78 Overall, though,
disciplinary appeals ﬂowing from union contracts have received little
concerted attention from legal scholars. This is an important oversight
because emerging evidence suggests that union contracts may establish
particularly cumbersome disciplinary appeals procedures that seem to
unfairly advantage oﬃcers facing suspensions or terminations.
Take, for example, a recent case in Cleveland, Ohio. There, the city
attempted to ﬁre six oﬃcers who jointly ﬁred 137 shots in 19.3 seconds at two
unarmed civilians inside their car.79 The terms of the Cleveland police union
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5DQB-J9XZ]
(reporting on an analysis of eighty-two police union contracts from large American cities which found a
“pattern of protections” for officers that also constituted “hurdles for residents filing abuse complaints”).
73 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1215-16 (describing why regulatory capture is theoretically plausible
in the police union negotiation process).
74 Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, The Effect of Collective
Bargaining on Law Enforcement: Evidence from Florida 25 (U. Chi., Pub. L. Working Paper No. 655, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095217.
75 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 30 at 1243-51 (calling for improved transparency in the negotiation
of police union contracts and considering some of the limitations of such a policy position).
76 See, e.g., Fisk & Richardson, supra note 61, at 777-97 (describing how policymakers could
empower new labor organizations to engage in a form of limited minority union bargaining).
77 See Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 50, at 3196 (using the term “cost-raising” to
describe these sorts of regulations).
78 See Rushin, supra note 30, at 1238-39 (finding that 115 of 178 police union contracts
analyzed “contain language that permits or requires the use of arbitration in adjudicating officer
appeals of disciplinary measures”).
79 Evan McDonald, Six Cleveland Police Officers Fired, Six Suspended for Roles in Deadly Chase and
Shooting, PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/
2016/01/ six_cleveland_police_officer_f.html [https://perma.cc/C2PM-SM4C]. The incident in
question began when an officer observed the civilian driving the car, Timothy Russell, failed to use
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contract gave each oﬃcer the right to challenge any termination to a thirdparty arbitrator, who issues a ﬁnal decision that is binding on all parties.80
The union contract also gave the arbitrator seemingly expansive authority to
re-litigate all of the factual and legal determinations made by the city during
earlier disciplinary proceedings.81 In that case, the assigned arbitrator
ultimately ordered the city to rehire ﬁve of the six oﬃcers involved in the
deadly shooting, over the ﬁerce objections of city leaders.82
These sorts of anecdotal accounts provide only limited insight. They do
not tell us whether union contracts across the country frequently oﬀer such
protective disciplinary appeals procedures. Given the lack of research on how
union contracts aﬀect disciplinary appeals procedures, there appears to be
substantial room for future research.
B. Law Enforcement Oﬃcer Bills of Rights
In addition to collective bargaining agreements, law enforcement officer
bills of rights (LEOBRs) also set strict limits on some types of internal
disciplinary action. These are state statutes passed via the legislative process
designed to provide a unique level of protection to all officers within a state.83
For example, Maryland’s LEOBR prevents localities from punishing officers
his turn signal, and attempted to execute a traffic stop. Ida Lieszkovszky, Everything You Need to Know
Before the Start of the Trial for Cleveland Police Officer Michael Brelo, PLAIN DEALER (April 6, 2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2015/04/everything_you_need_to_know_be.html
[https://perma.cc/E2KR-G4ML]. Russell failed to stop, and instead led oﬃcers on a twenty-two
mile chase. McDonald, supra. At various points, upwards of sixty-two squad cars were involved in
the case, before it ended near a local middle school. Lieszkovszky, supra. When one oﬃcer opened
ﬁre on the vehicle, twelve other oﬃcers joined in. Id. The oﬃcers ﬁred a total of 137 shots in 19.3
seconds at the vehicle, hitting both Russell and Williams over 20 times each, killing both of them
instantly. McDonald, supra. Later investigations conﬁrmed that both Russell and Williams were
apparently unarmed. Id.
80 Speciﬁcally, the union contract states that “[d]iscipline shall fall under the grievance
procedure,” meaning that oﬃcers have the right to challenge disciplinary action through up to four
layers of disciplinary review, ultimately culminating in a challenge before a third-party arbitrator,
selected “in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Cleveland
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 71, at 42-44. The decision by the arbitrator is
considered “binding on the City, the Union, and the members . . .” and contract provides virtually
no guidance on the limits of the arbitrator’s authority to re-review all disciplinary ﬁndings. Id.
81 Id.
82 Adam Ferrise, Michael Brelo Stays Fired, Other Officers Involved in ‘137-Shots’ Chase Get
Jobs Back, Cleveland (June 13, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/06/
michael_brelo_stays_fired_othe.html [https://perma.cc/2GDK-L88W].
83 These state statutes emerged in part because of the decision in Garrity v. New Jersey where
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state could not use compelled statements from disciplinary
interviews in later criminal prosecutions. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1220-23 (2016) (discussing how LEOBRs arose as a response to police unions
feeling that Garrity had not gone far enough, and that they still possessed fewer constitutional
protections than other citizens).

562

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 545

for any “brutality” unless someone files a complaint within 366 days.84 It also
allows the removal of civilian complaints from officer personnel files after three
years.85 Louisiana’s LEOBR provides officers with up to thirty days to secure
counsel before investigators can interview them about alleged misconduct.86 In
Florida, the LEOBR requires investigators to provide an officer under
investigation with all evidence related to the investigation before beginning an
interrogation.87 This includes the name of all complainants, physical evidence,
incident reports, GPS locational data, audio evidence, and video recordings.88
In Illinois, the LEOBR bars the consideration of anonymous civilian
complaints.89 And in Delaware, the LEOBR bars municipalities from requiring
officers to disclose personal assets as a condition of employment.90 These only
scratch the surface of the protective procedures offered by LEOBRs to police
officers facing internal investigations.
There has been a surge of recent scholarship describing the content and
policy implications of LEOBRs. Kevin M. Keenan and Professor Samuel
Walker conducted the most comprehensive empirical study of LEOBRs to
date. They coded the content of fourteen LEOBRs for fifty separate
variables.91 Based on this coding, they concluded that a number of LEOBRs
contained unreasonably protective procedures that arguably thwarted
reasonable accountability and oversight.92 Similarly, a study by Professors
Aziz Z. Huq and Richard H. McAdams identified twenty existing
LEOBRs, which often establish so-called “interrogation buffers,” such as
“delay privileges” that impair officer accountability by mandating a delay
period before an officer may be interviewed or interrogated.93 Additionally,
a number of media outlets have begun to recognize the ways that LEOBRs

MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(c) (West 2019).
Id. § 3-110(a).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2531(4)(a) (2019).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.532(d) (2019).
Id.
50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 725/3.8(b) (2019) (“Anyone ﬁling a complaint against a sworn peace
oﬃcer must have the complaint supported by a sworn aﬃdavit.”).
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9202 (2019).
91 See generally Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Oﬃcers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185 (2005).
92 Id. at 241-42 (concluding that there are ﬁve distinct provisions found in some LEOBRs,
both existing and proposed, and several other identiﬁable problem areas, that serve as potential
barriers to police accountability).
93 Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. L. FORUM 213, 222 (identifying twenty
states that have LEOBRs on the books that “regulate how administrative investigators can
interview or interrogate police officers . . . in a disciplinary investigation,” nine of which include
some form of delay privilege).
84
85
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can tip the scales in favor of the officer during disciplinary cases.94 Other
scholars, like Professor Kate Levine, have argued that some components of
LEOBRs—particularly limits on abusive interrogation techniques—ought
to serve as a blueprint for how the law could protect the rights of criminal
suspects during criminal interrogations.95
While each of these past studies has made an important contribution to
the field, the existing scholarship on LEOBRs spends little time discussing
the topic of disciplinary appeals. This may be in part because, as one study
found, LEOBRs often do not provide appellate procedures.96 Instead, they
tend to provide limitations on the investigation and initial adjudication of
internal disciplinary matters.
C. Civil Service Statutes
Finally, the majority of states and the District of Columbia have given
public employees, including police oﬃcers, additional employment
protection via civil service laws.97 These laws emerged, in part, as an attempt
to ensure that government jobs were allocated based on merit, rather than
political patronage.98 While these laws initially focused on the hiring and
discharge of civil servants, they now cover at least eighty percent of state and
local government employees, and their focus has expanded to include
“demotions, transfers, layoﬀs and recalls, discharges, . . . grievances, pay and
beneﬁt determinations, and classiﬁcation of positions.”99
Because they often apply equally to all large classes of government
employees across an entire state, civil service laws operate as a “ﬂoor for police
94 See, e.g., Eli Hager, Blue Shield: Did you Know Police Have Their Own Bill of Rights?,
MARSHALL PROJECT (April 27, 2015), http://www.themarshallproject.com/2015/04/27/blue-shield
[https://perma.cc/RFZ9-NVPK] (noting that “[a]s many as 11 other states are considering similar
legislation, and many of the rest have written essentially the same rights and privileges into their
contracts with police unions.”).
95 Levine, supra note 83, at 1212.
96 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1266 app. c (showing that no existing LEOBR appears to elaborate
procedures for arbitration on appeal).
97 For some representative examples of legislation establishing a civil service system for
law enforcement officers, see ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-180 to 190 (2008), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-1001 to 1007 (1956), ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-51-301 to 311 (2013 & Supp. 2015), COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 31-30-101 to 107 (2016), and D.C. CODE §§ 5-101.01 to 5.133-21, 5-1302 to 5-1305
(2001 & Supp. 2016). At least a few states do not appear to have civil service systems that would
cover local law enforcement officers.
98 See ROBERT G. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 1-3 (1976). Historians
have traced the origins of modern civil service statutes to the assassination of President James
Garfield in 1881 by a “disappointed officer seeker” which contributed to the passage of the
Pendleton Act two years later. Id.
99 Ann C. Hodges, The Interplay of Civil Service Law and Collective Bargaining Law in Public
Sector Employee Discipline Cases, 32 B.C. L. REV. 95, 102 (1990).
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oﬃcer employment protections, which police unions can raise through
collective bargaining,” or through LEOBRs.100
Outside of police union contracts, LEOBRs, and civil service statutes,
departmental regulations and city ordinances also commonly establish
the boundaries of acceptable practices during internal investigations of
police officers.101
II. EXISTING RESEARCH ON DISCIPLINARY APPEALS
While some studies have shed important light on how union contracts
and LEOBRs establish problematic internal disciplinary procedures, there
has been little research evaluating the disciplinary appeals process used in
American police departments.102 And the limited existing research on
police disciplinary appeals has been outcome oriented. That is to say, the
existing research focuses on the outcomes of police disciplinary appeals, not
the procedures that contributed to those outcomes. This small body of
literature suggests that police disciplinary appeals frequently result in the
reduction of officer punishment.
For example, Mark Iris conducted two important empirical examinations
of the effect of appellate arbitration on disciplinary outcomes in Houston
and Chicago.103 He found that in Houston between 1994 and 1998, and in
Chicago between 1990 and 1993, arbitrators regularly reduced or overturned
officer suspensions and firings.104 Similarly, Tyler Adams recently conducted
a valuable national study of ninety-two police arbitrator decisions published
by the Bloomberg Law’s Labor and Employment Law Resource Center
between 2011 and 2015.105 He coded these arbitration decisions to identify
common justifications for arbitrators overturning police discipline on

Rushin, supra note 30, at 1208.
This study does not look at these local ordinances or internal departmental policies.
This means that, if anything, this study underrepresents the frequency of use of each of the
elements described below. See infra Part IV.
102 For example, some of the existing studies have discussed the internal investigation process,
or the initial disciplinary decision-making process. All of these are important subjects for scholarly
consideration. But they are distinguishable from the disciplinary appeals process. One study, though,
did code for the presence of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. See Rushin, supra
note 30, at 1238-39 (showing that 115 of the 178 contracts examined as part of that study appeared to
permit or require binding arbitration in cases of disciplinary appeals).
103 See generally Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215 (1998); Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Houston: The Arbitration Experience,
5 POLICE Q. 132 (2002).
104 Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago, supra note 103, at 216; Iris, Police Discipline in Houston,
supra note 103, at 141-43.
105 See generally Tyler Adams, Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does It
Take to Fire a Bad Cop? 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133 (2016).
100
101
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appeal.106 He found that arbitrators often cited inadequate departmental
investigations, a lack of proof about the guilt of discharged officers, failure
by investigators to adhere to procedural requirements during officer
investigations, and mitigating factors in an officer’s personnel file to justify
appellate relief from disciplinary action.107
These ﬁndings are roughly consistent with a number of examinations
conducted by media outlets. For example, Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery,
and Steven Rich of the Washington Post found that, of the 1,881 oﬃcers ﬁred
for oﬃcer misconduct in the nation’s largest police departments over the last
several years, the disciplinary appeals process reinstated the employment of
over 450 of these oﬃcers.108 They found that the disciplinary appeals process
forced the Philadelphia Police Department to rehire sixty-two percent of
oﬃcers ﬁred for misconduct during this time period.109 Similarly, the
disciplinary appeals process used by the Denver Police Department resulted
in the rehiring of sixty-eight percent of terminated oﬃcers.110 And in San
Antonio, the police department had to rehire an astounding seventy percent
of oﬃcers it had ﬁred, because of disciplinary appeals.111 Similarly, Robert
Angien and Dan Horn of the Cincinnati Enquirer found that between 1997
and 2001, roughly one in every four oﬃcer suspensions or terminations were
reversed or reduced on appeal.112
Combined, the existing literature presents compelling evidence that the
disciplinary appeals process may serve as a barrier to officer accountability.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a critical gap in the existing literature. Little
academic research has comprehensively examined and described the
procedural process employed in disciplinary appeals across a substantial crosssection of American police departments. More specifically, the existing
literature has not provided a comprehensive, descriptive account of how
appeals of discipline work across the nation’s 18,000 police departments. How
many levels of appeal are available to police officers facing disciplinary
106 Id. at 133-34 (“Part III identiﬁes the factors most signiﬁcant in arbitrators’ decisions
overturning police discharges and notes the particular importance of oﬃcers’ good character in
decision reversing discharges.”).
107 Based on these findings, Adams challenged the “Myth of the Untouchable Officer.” Id. at 155.
108 Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, supra note 1. I discuss this study in more depth, infra Section IV.D.
109 Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, supra note 1.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Robert Angien & Dan Horn, Police Discipline Inconsistent: Sanctions Most Likely to Be Reduced,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 21, 2001), http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/10/21/loc_police_discipline.html.
Reporting out of local news outlets in Philadelphia has also exhibited concern for the ways
that disciplinary appeals put problematic officers back on the streets. Dan Stamm, Police
Commish Angry That 90 Percent of Fired Officers Get Jobs Back, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Police-Officers-Get-Jobs-Back-194100131.html
[https://perma.cc/EGW2-RQUB].
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sanctions? How many police departments allow arbitrators or comparable
third parties to have the final say in disciplinary appeals? How do communities
select the identity of an arbitrator assigned to conduct a disciplinary appeal?
And do communities limit the scope of an arbitrator’s authority on appeal?
The answers to these questions—that is the procedural process used to
adjudicate police disciplinary appeals—likely has a significant effect on the
outcome of the appeal. For example, the manner by which police
departments select an arbitrator can affect the frequency by which that
arbitrator will overturn disciplinary action. If police supervisors unilaterally
selected an arbitrator, then that arbitrator may feel pressure to approve of
any punishments handed down by those supervisors. Conversely, if a police
union unilaterally selected an arbitrator, then that arbitrator may feel
pressure to overturn or reduce punishment against a union member.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many communities establish a designated
list of acceptable arbitrators through union contracts,113 or employ a system
whereby the police union and police supervisors “alternately strike names
off [a designated] list; the last name remaining gets the assignment.”114 Such
a selection process may contribute to arbitrator decisions that split the
difference between supervisor and union demands, since siding too
frequently with one side or the other might endanger an arbitrator’s selection
in future cases through an alternate strike system.115
The bottom line is that procedure matters. And there appears to be a
descriptive gap in the literature when it comes to the procedures used to
adjudicate disciplinary appeals in American police departments.
III. METHODOLOGY
As discussed above, it is challenging to understand fully the range of
disciplinary appeals used across the thousands of decentralized American
police departments. To begin understanding the kinds of disciplinary appeals
procedures oﬀered to police in the United States, this Article relies on a
dataset of police union contracts. 116 Consistent with other recent studies of
113 Iris found that Chicago is one of the communities that employs such a permanent panel of
designated arbitrators. See Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, supra note 103, at 146.
114 Id. (identifying Houston as a city that has employed such an alternate strike system).
115 Interestingly, Iris found that the manner by which communities select arbitrators does
not seem to predict the ways in which arbitrators later rule. Id. at 146-47 (“That the means
through which arbitrators are selected in Houston and Chicago are so different yet produce such
similar results . . . .”). This Article finds more evidence to bolster this anecdotal finding by Iris,
as discussed in Part V.
116 Because of the long process of collecting and coding these contracts, plus the long editing
and publication process, some of these contracts may no longer be active by the time this Article
comes out in print. Nevertheless, this should not aﬀect the overall claims from this Article. This
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police policies, this dataset focuses on municipal police departments, rather
than sheriﬀ ’s departments, state highway patrols, or other specialized law
enforcement agencies.117 Public records requests, searches of municipal
websites, searches of state repositories, and web searches resulted in the
collection of police union contracts from 656 municipal agencies serving large
and midsized communities across the country. This dataset builds on, and
would not have been possible without, the important eﬀorts of other
researchers who have also collected police union contracts, including the
Better Government Association, Campaign Zero,118 the Combined Law
Enforcement Associations of Texas,119 the Guardian,120 Labor Relations
Information Systems,121 and Reuters.122 A complete list of the departments
studied as part of this dataset is available in the Appendix. The dataset covers
police oﬃcers in forty-two states that permit police unionization.
Approximately sixty-one percent of the contracts in this dataset come
from municipal websites, eighteen percent from state websites, ﬁve percent
from police association or union websites, and two percent from media
reports. Another three percent of these contracts were only available through
previous union contract collections by other organizations which make some
contracts available online.123 Finally, I obtained the remaining approximately
eleven percent of contracts through open record requests, as they are not
otherwise publicly available. The municipal departments covered in this
Article merely claims that a large number of municipalities utilize common disciplinary appeals
processes. There is no reason to think that there has been any substantial change over the last several
years in disciplinary appeals procedures across a large number of communities. And given the size
of the dataset and the overwhelming consistency among jurisdictions, there is no reason to think
that this inevitable limitation has skewed the overall results in any signiﬁcant way.
117 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA.
L. REV. 395, 423-24 (2016) (coding police body camera policies from the largest 100 municipal police
departments); Rushin, supra note 30, at 1217-19 (coding police union contracts from municipalities
with at least 100,000 residents).
118 See MCKESSON ET AL., supra note 68 (collecting and coding eighty-one police union
contracts from the largest one hundred municipal police departments).
119 See Contracts, C OMBINED L AW E NF’T A SS’NS T EX., https://www.cleat.org/contracts
[https://perma.cc/37EK-347A] (making numerous contracts from Texas available through their website)
120 See George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will Be Kept
Secret, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-filescontain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret [https://perma.cc/V83L-Y8TJ] (discussing the
contents of sixty-seven contracts leaked as part of a hack of the Fraternal Order of Police).
121 See Contract Library, LABOR RELATIONS INFO. SYS., https://www.lris.com/contracts/index.php
[https://perma.cc/J9BA-VQDN] (providing a database of union contracts from a number of police
departments across the country).
122 See Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and
Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:16 PM GMT), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5DQB-J9XZ] (collecting the coding eighty-two contracts from
the largest one hundred municipal police departments in the United States).
123 Supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text.
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dataset serve a total population of around ninety-seven million Americans.
The median population served by this dataset is around 68,000 residents.
This Article focuses speciﬁcally on union contracts rather than other
sources of police disciplinary appeals. This Article does not code or explore
the ways that law enforcement oﬃcer bills of rights (LEOBRs), civil service
statutes, internal departmental policies, and municipal ordinances aﬀect
disciplinary appeals.124 This means that, the ﬁndings described in Part IV may
actually underrepresent the frequency of these appellate procedures in
communities that choose not to negotiate about appellate procedures during
collective bargaining, but nonetheless provide similar protections to those
described in this Article through LEOBRs, civil service statutes, municipal
ordinances, or internal departmental policies.
This Article also focuses specifically on mid-to-large municipal police
departments. Thus, it is not necessarily generalizable to all police departments,
particularly those in small, nonunionized municipalities. While a large number
of police officers in the United States are members of unions, there may be
reasons to believe that disciplinary appeals procedures differ in unionized and
nonunionized agencies. Nevertheless, given the relative ubiquity of police
unionization,125 and given the fact that disciplinary appellate procedures are
often considered appropriate topics for collective bargaining,126 this dataset
provides detailed insight into the disciplinary appellate procedures used across
a large segment of unionized police departments.
Before coding the dataset for this Article, I ﬁrst identiﬁed relevant coding
variables and deﬁnitions. To do this in a manner consistent with prior studies
of police policies, I conducted a preliminary examination of the dataset and
surveyed the existing literature discussed in Part II to identify recurring
procedural elements of the disciplinary appeals process that may reduce
democratic accountability or insulate oﬃcers from accountability.127 Through
this iterative process, I settled on ﬁve coding variables, which I discuss in

124 A reporter from the Marshall Project identiﬁed fourteen LEOBRs: California, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Hager, supra note 94. In addition, based on analysis by
Aziz Huq and Richard McAdams, a handful of other states appear to have statutes on the books that
eﬀectively function as LEOBRs, even if they may not be labeled as such. Huq & McAdams, supra
note 93, at 222. Distinguishing between LEOBRs and civil service statutes can be diﬃcult. Some
LEOBRs are explicitly articulated separately from civil service statutes. Other times, it can be hard
to distinguish between civil service statutes and LEOBRs.
125 See REAVES, supra note 32, at 13 (ﬁnding that around two-thirds of oﬃcers are employed by
departments that engage in collective bargaining).
126 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1205-07.
127 See, e.g., Fan, supra note 117, at 425 (describing the development of the coding book for a
similar study of police body camera policies).
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more detail in Part IV. Table 1 summarizes the deﬁnitions employed during
the coding of the dataset.
Table 1: Coding Variables and Deﬁnitions
Variable

Deﬁnition

Appealable to Arbitration or
Comparable Procedure

Police officers may appeal
disciplinary action to an arbitrator,
or a comparable third party

Signiﬁcant Review Authority

Arbitrator has de novo or comparable
authority to rehear factual and/or legal
determinations made by police
supervisors (e.g., police chief), civilian
review boards, or city officials

Control Over Selection of
Arbitrator or Comparable

Police union or police officer has
significant authority to select the
identity of the arbitrator or third party
that will hear the appeal (e.g., striking
names from panel or demanding new
panels)

Arbitrator or Comparable Third
Party Makes Final Decision

The arbitrator or comparable third
party has the final say in disciplinary
decision, generally disclosing further
review

Levels of Appellate Review

The numerical number of levels of
appellate review an officer may utilize
before a punishment becomes final

Using the definitions from Table 1, the dataset underwent two rounds of
coding to determine the number of municipalities that fall into each coding
category—that is, to determine whether the police union contracts provided
for a disciplinary appeal procedure that was consistent with the definition
listed in Table 1. Given that the dataset included 656 police union contracts
coded across 5 variables identified in Table 1, I ultimately made 3,280 coding
decisions as part of this analysis. There was substantial agreement in the
decisions rendered through each of these rounds of coding, suggesting a
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relatively high level of reliability.128 Nevertheless, the binary nature of the
coding used in this study sometimes lends itself to difficult choices. Not all
contracts had provisions that neatly fit into these coding parameters. In these
borderline cases, there is certainly room for reasonable disagreement. In a
small percentage of cases—around one percent of all coding decisions—these
two rounds of coding led to different decisions as to whether a police union
contract satisfied one of the variable definitions listed in Table 1. In such cases,
the union contract underwent a third and final round of coding.
Given the large size of the dataset and the relatively small number of
borderline cases, I do not believe the discretionary application of the
variable definitions in Table 1 to these borderline cases resulted in any
systematic error that would undermine the validity of the central findings
of this Article. Additionally, the goal of this Article is not to analyze the
disciplinary appeals procedures of any one police department. Thus, while
coding such a large dataset will almost invariably introduce occasional
inconsistencies, the methodology used in this Article is designed to provide
a comprehensive evaluation of broad trends in disciplinary appeals
procedures across a large cross-section of American police departments. A
more detailed discussion of the methodology, particularly focused on the
development of variable definitions used in this Article, is available in
Appendix B. As Part IV explains, this coding revealed significant similarity
across the disciplinary appeals procedures.
IV. HOW POLICE DISCIPLINARY APPEALS LIMIT ACCOUNTABILITY
The overwhelming majority of police departments in the dataset employ
a similar disciplinary appeals process—one that, I argue, may theoretically
shield oﬃcers from reasonable accountability eﬀorts. Table 2 breaks down the
frequency of each variable in the dataset.
Table 2: Frequency of Police Disciplinary Appellate Procedures in Dataset of
Union Contracts
Variable

Frequency

Appealable to Arbitration or Comparable
Procedure

72.9%

Signiﬁcant Review Authority

70.1%

128 There was also one single coder used throughout. Thus, there is no reason for concern about
the consistency of coding between multiple coders. See, e.g., id.
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Control Over Selection of Arbitrator or
Comparable Third Party

54.3%

Arbitrator or Comparable Third Party Makes
Final Decision

68.8%

In total, just under half (forty-eight percent) of all union contracts
included in this dataset provide officers with all of the procedural
protections discussed in Table 2. That is, they give officers the chance to
appeal to an arbitrator, they give officers or unions some significant power
to select the identity of the arbitrator, they provide this arbitrator with
significant power to override earlier factual or legal decisions, and they
make the arbitrator’s decision final and binding on the police department.
And around seventy-one percent of cities provide officers with at least three
of these procedural protections on appeal.
The median police department in the dataset oﬀers police oﬃcers up to
four layers of appellate review in disciplinary cases. Some departments
provided oﬃcers with as few as one layer of appellate review.129 Others
provided oﬃcers with as many as six or seven levels of appellate review.130
The subparts that follow discuss other common procedures oﬀered to police
oﬃcers appealing disciplinary action.
A. Binding Arbitration
Approximately seventy-three percent of the police departments use a
disciplinary appeals process that involves some sort of outside arbitration.
This includes the overwhelming majority of the largest American cities,

129 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between Representatives of the City of Chino
and the Chino Police Oﬃcers Association, Exhibit A, 6 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (describing
single layer of disciplinary appeals); Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Colton
and the Colton Police Oﬃcers Association 4-10 (2017) (on ﬁle with author) [hereinafter City of
Colton] (describing how appeals of suspensions in excess of three days, disciplinary salary
reductions, demotions, and discharges automatically proceed to the ﬁnal step of the grievance
procedures—arbitration, and how appeals of minor disciplinary action involve a single layer of
appeal to a head of department or designee).
130 See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Edmond and the Fraternal Order of Police Local 136,
at 10, 15-18 (2016) (on ﬁle with author) (providing for six layers of appellate review through the
grievance procedure); Agreement Between City of Kettering, Ohio and Fraternal Order of Police,
Kettering Lodge No. 92, Patrol Oﬃcers 13-15 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (allowing seven stages of
appeal through the city’s grievance procedures before binding arbitration occurs).
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including Austin,131 Boston,132 Chicago,133 Cincinnati,134 Cleveland,135
Columbus,136 Miami,137 and Omaha,138 as well as smaller and mid-sized cities
like Billings, Montana,139 Edison, New Jersey,140 Flint, Michigan,141 Green
Bay, Wisconsin,142 and Menlo Park, California.143
In most jurisdictions however, police oﬃcers appealing disciplinary action
do not immediately proceed to arbitration. Instead, oﬃcers generally have
the ability to seek relief on appeal at various intermediary levels.144 For
131 See Agreement Between the City of Austin and the Austin Police Association 49 (2013)
(on file with author) (establishing procedures for police to appeal disciplinary action to expedited arbitration).
132 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between City of Boston and Boston Police
Patrolmen’s Association, Inc. 7-10 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Boston]
(providing police officers with the ability to appeal disciplinary action to binding arbitration at
step five of the grievance procedures).
133 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 17, 84-85 (2012) (articulating the standard for
binding arbitration on appeal).
134 See Labor Agreement by and Between Queen City Lodge No. 69 Fraternal Order of Police
and the City of Cincinnati, Non-Supervisors 2, 5 (2016) (on ﬁle with author) (allowing oﬃcers to
proceed directly to ﬁnal arbitration on appeal in cases of suspensions of more than ﬁve days without
pay, discharge, demotion, or termination).
135 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police
Patrolmen’s Association (C.P.P.A.), Non-Civilian Personnel 44 (on ﬁle with author) (stating that
the arbitration procedures articulated in the grievance procedure shall be “ﬁnal, conclusive, and
binding on the City, the Union, and the members.”).
136 See Agreement Between City of Columbus and Fraternal Order of Police, Capital city
Lodge No. 9 41-44 (2014) (on ﬁle with author) (allowing oﬃcers to proceed, at step ﬁve of the
grievance procedure, to arbitration with the approval of the Lodge President).
137 See Agreement Between City of Miami, Miami, Florida and Fraternal Order of Police,
Walter E. Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge No. 20, 13-15 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (establishing
grievance procedures that permit arbitration at step four).
138 See Agreement Between the City of Omaha, Nebraska and the Omaha Police Officers
Association 15-17 (2014) (on file with author) (permitting arbitration on appeal at step three of
the grievance procedure).
139 See Montana, Agreement Between the City of Billings, Montana and Montana Public
Employees Association, Billings Police Unit 6-9 (2015) (on file with author) (articulating
arbitration procedure on appeal).
140 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Township of Edison and Policemen’s
Benevolent Association, Local No. 75, Inc. 49-51 (2014) (on file with author) (articulating
standards for arbitration of grievances).
141 See Agreement Between the City of Flint and Flint Police Oﬃcers Association 23, 35-39
(2014) (on ﬁle with author) (allowing oﬃcers to pursue arbitration of disciplinary action).
142 See Agreement Between City of Green Bay and Green Bay Professional Police Association
6-7 (2016) (on ﬁle with author) (permitting binding arbitration on appeal).
143 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Menlo Park Police Oﬃcers’ Association
and the City of Menlo Park 21-22 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (stating that oﬃcers can bring some
disciplinary appeals to arbitration).
144 For example, in Las Cruces, New Mexico, the union contract provides officers with the chance
to first bring appeals to their immediate supervisor. See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Las
Cruces and Fraternal Order of Police, Las Cruces Police Officer’s Association 49-51 (2017) (on file with
author) (describing how, at step one, a grievant must first discuss their objection to disciplinary action
with their immediate supervisor, and then with the Chief of Police). If the officer does not receive
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example, the union contract in Midwest City, Oklahoma provides oﬃcers
with the chance to ﬁrst ﬁle an appeal with their supervisor.145 If the
employee’s grievance remains unresolved after this initial step, they may next
ﬁle a grievance with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Grievance
Committee.146 Thereafter the FOP Grievance Committee may submit the
appeal to the next highest supervisor.147 Then, the Chief of Police has the
ability to respond to the appeal, or the Chief may refer the matter to the
Labor Management Review Board.148 If the oﬃcer fails to get relief on appeal
after these initial steps, the appeal goes before the City Manager.149 And
ﬁnally, if the grievance remains unresolved after review by the City Manager,
the FOP may request binding arbitration.150 The procedures used in Midwest
City, Oklahoma are consistent with those used by a large number of police
departments in the dataset. At the end of the appeals process, oﬃcers
frequently have the opportunity to present their appeal to an arbitrator.
In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that employ arbitration on
appeal, and in 68.7% of all jurisdictions analyzed as part of this study, the
decision from this arbitration decision is ﬁnal. Nevertheless, some
communities like Independence, Missouri,151 and Indio, California,152 do not
employ binding arbitration. Instead, these communities make arbitration
advisory or permit additional review of arbitrators’ decisions.
A number of scholars and media outlets have hypothesized that
arbitration as an appellate mechanism may contribute to the frequent
reversals of or reductions in internal disciplinary sanctions. 153 According
appellate relief through this initial layer of review, the department then permits an intermediary level
of review at the level of the Chief of Police, and then the City Manager. Id. at 50.
145 See Collective Bargaining Agreement for Fiscal Year 2017/2018 Between the Fraternal order
of Police Lodge #127 and the City of Midwest City 10-15 (2017) (on ﬁle with author) (laying out the
city’s procedures for disciplinary appeals).
146 Id. at 12.
147 Id.
148 See id. at 13 (describing this procedure and establishing a time limit for action).
149 See id. (“If the Grievance or Disciplinary Appeal is still unresolved after receipt of the answer from
the Chief of Police, the Grievance or Disciplinary Appeal may be submitted to the City Manager . . . .”).
150 See id. (“If the Grievance or Disciplinary Appeal is unresolved after receipt of the answer
from the City Manager, the FOP may request that the matter be submitted to impartial arbitration.”).
151 See Working Agreement Between City of Independence, Missouri, Police Department
& Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 1, at 22 (2017) (on file with author) (giving the City
Manager the ability to “modify a decision of the Grievance Board or an arbitrator” when the
“finding of fact and decision based thereon are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of
the evidence . . . together with the legitimate inferences”).
152 See Indio Police Officers’ Association Comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding
44-46 (2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Indio] (establishing advisory arbitration,
rather than binding arbitration).
153 See, e.g., Roger Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 363,
365 (2016) (“And, even assuming the officer is fired for violating the Constitution or for other reasons,
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to these hypotheses, arbitration is diﬀerent from other forms of disciplinary
appeals, in part because it limits community observation or participation. On
this point, a number of jurisdictions in this study, like Colton, California,154
require that all arbitration proceedings are conducted in private without
public observation, while other cities like Corpus Christi, Texas,155 give
oﬃcers the option to make arbitration proceedings private.
Even so, arbitration by itself may not be problematic as a tool for adjudicating
disciplinary appeals. But when combined with some of the features described in
the next two Sections, arbitration may become a more problematic method of
limiting democratic accountability in American police departments.
B. Control over Selection of Arbitrator
A little over fifty-four percent of all departments in the dataset give
police officers or the police union significant authority in the selection of
the arbitrator that will hear a case on appeal. Major cities including
Boston,156 Chicago,157 Detroit,158 El Paso,159 Fort Worth,160 Honolulu,161

in many jurisdictions, the collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of the issue, and it
is quite common for the officer to be put back on the job, leading to back pay and reinstatement.”).
154 See City of Colton, supra note 129, at 7 (“Grievance arbitration hearings shall be private.”).
155 See Agreement Between the City of Corpus Christi and the Corpus Christi Police Oﬃcers’
Association 20 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) [hereinafter City of Corpus Christi] (“All hearings shall
be public unless requested by the appealing employee that the hearing shall be closed to the public.
In any event, the ﬁnal decision of the arbitrator shall be public, although public announcement may
be reasonably delayed upon request of the parties.”). It is worth noting that even in cities that use a
city manager or other city agent to hear appellate cases, some still allow the oﬃcer to bar public
observation of the proceeding. See City of Murrieta, supra note 43, at 8 (“The hearing may be open
to the public or closed at the employee’s option.”).
156 See City of Boston, supra note 132, at 9 (“The arbitrator shall be selected in a manner
mutually agreed upon by the parties from a rotating panel of not less than three (3) and not more
than ﬁve (5) arbitrators selected by mutual agreement of the parties.”).
157 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 84 (establishing a panel of agreeable arbitrators
between the city and the police union).
158 See Master Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the Detroit Police Oﬃcers
Association 11-12 (2014) (on ﬁle with author) [hereinafter City of Detroit] (establishing an
alternative striking procedure by which the union can remove potential arbitrators).
159 See Articles of Agreement Between City of El Paso, Texas and El Paso Municipal Police
Oﬃcers’ Association 42 (2014) (establishing a procedure for union and city to agree on panel of ﬁve
individuals to serve terms as members of the hearing examiner panel).
160 See Meet and Confer Labor Agreement Between City of Fort Worth, Texas and Fort
Worth Police Officers Association 23-24 (2017) (on file with author) (giving the union an equal
role in selecting the identity of hearing examiners, who act in a role equivalent to arbitrators, for
the appeal of disciplinary actions).
161 See Agreement Between State of Hawaii, City and County of Honolulu, County of Hawaii,
County of Maui, County of Kauai and State of Hawaii Organization of Police Oﬃcers Bargaining
Unit 12, at 49-50 (2011) (on ﬁle with author) (providing for an alternate striking system empowering
the union to remove names from the panel of potential arbitrators).
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Jacksonville,162 Las Vegas,163 Memphis,164 Milwaukee,165 Minneapolis,166 and
Oakland167 allow officers or their union representatives to have this sort of
control over the identity of an arbitrator, as do smaller and medium-sized cities
like Akron, Ohio,168 Boulder, Colorado,169 Canton, Ohio,170 Champaign,
Illinois,171 and Fairbanks, Alaska.172
Most of these departments fall into two different categories: First, a handful
of agencies explicitly stipulate an acceptable panel of arbitrators in their union
contract. For example, in Chicago, the Fraternal Order of Police and the City of
Chicago have agreed on a panel of five stipulated arbitrators in the appendix to
the police union contract.173 This means that, in cities like Chicago, the identity
of appellate arbitrators is a topic of negotiation during collective bargaining—a
topic where the union can exert a significant influence.
Second, another group of agencies establish alternative striking
procedures. For instance, in Corpus Christi, the union contract allows oﬃcers

162 See Agreement Between the City of Jacksonville and the Fraternal Order of Police, Police
Oﬃcers Through Sergeants 21 (2011) (on ﬁle with author) (requiring mutual agreement between
union and city for the appointment of an arbitrator to a rotating list).
163 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
& Las Vegas Police Protective Association 19 (2016) (on file with author) (establishing procedure
for union to select two of five potential arbitrators, with two additional arbitrators selected by
the city, and one selected by mutual agreement).
164 See Agreement Between the Memphis Police Association and the City of Memphis,
Tennessee 20 (2016) (on file with author) (establishing the alternate striking method for selecting
an arbitrator, thereby giving union equal power as city).
165 See Agreement Between City of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Police Association, Local #21,
I.U.P.A., AFL-CIO 12 (2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Milwaukee] (using alternate
striking method for selecting arbitrator).
166 See Labor Agreement Between the City of Minneapolis and the Police Officers’
Federation of Minneapolis, at app. H (2017) (on file with author) (establishing alternate striking
methodology for selecting arbitrators).
167 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oakland and Oakland Police Officers’
Association 36-37 (2015) (on file with author) (using an alternate striking system for selecting arbitrators).
168 See Agreement Between the City of Akron and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #7, at 8
(Nov. 15, 2016) (on ﬁle with author) (alternatively striking names from a panel of arbitrators).
169 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between City of Boulder and Boulder Police Officers
Association 13 (2016) (on file with author) (describing alternative strike methodology for selecting arbitrator).
170 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Canton and Canton Police
Patrolmen’s Association Local 98/I.U.P.A. AFL-CIO 8-9 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (establishing
a mutually agreed panel of arbitrator provided in union contract).
171 See Agreement Between Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign Patrol and
Sergeant 66 (2015) (on file with author) (providing for an alternative striking methodology and
a confidential proceeding).
172 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Fairbanks and the Public Safety
Employees Association, Fairbanks Police Department Chapter 11 (Dec. 23, 2011) (on ﬁle with
author) (establishing an alternative striking methodology from pre-agreed list of arbitrators).
173 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 84 app. Q (describing how the city and the police
union have agreed on a panel of ﬁve arbitrators to be used in expedited arbitrations).
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to appeal “any disciplinary action” to an arbitrator.174 To select this arbitrator,
the Director of Human Resources requests seven arbitrators from the
National Academy of Arbitrators, or other “qualiﬁed agencies.”175 Thereafter,
the police oﬃcer facing discipline and the city alternatively strike names from
this panel of seven arbitrators until one name remains.176
In theory, these procedures for selecting the identity of an arbitrator
somewhat mirror the procedures for selecting jurors in the American justice
system. The voir dire process provides both the defense and the plaintiﬀ or
prosecution with a limited number of preemptory strikes, as well as an
unlimited number of strikes for cause.177 Much like the procedure described
above, a court will usually impanel the individuals that survive this striking
process as the jury.178 If this procedure is eﬀective at impaneling impartial
jurors in the American justice system, why not use a similar procedure to
select an arbitrator for an appellate proceeding?
The potential problem with using such a procedure in internal
disciplinary appeals is that it may incentivize arbitrators to consistently
compromise on punishment to increase their probability of being selected in
future cases. Unlike a juror in the American justice system, arbitrators are
often repeat players.179 Arbitrators must frequently survive these selection
procedures in order to obtain work in the future. An arbitrator that
frequently sides with either police management or officers during appellate
procedures may be unlikely to survive future selection proceedings.180 From
an accountability perspective, this mindset can be highly problematic if it
results in arbitrators feeling compelled to frequently reduce the termination
of unfit officers to mere suspensions.
C. De Novo Review
The majority of communities—around seventy percent—vest arbitrators
with significant review authority on appeal. That is, these jurisdictions
effectively give arbitrators the power to re-review all relevant issues on appeal.
This means that arbitration on appeal provides officers with an opportunity
City of Corpus Christi, supra note 155, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 84853 (2015) (providing an excellent, preliminary summary of the voir dire process).
178 Id.
179 See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (distinguishing between repeat players and one shotters).
180 See Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, supra note 103, at 146 (evaluating whether an
arbitrator’s past decisions influence whether or not he or she will be selected to preside over similar
disciplinary appeals in the future).
174
175
176
177
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to relitigate disciplinary matters with little deference to decisions made by
police supervisors, city officials, or civilian review boards. This sort of
extensive review is provided in large American cities like Anchorage,181 the
District of Columbia,182 and Orlando,183 as well as smaller communities like
Albany, New York,184 Danville, Illinois,185 and New Haven, Connecticut.186
Thus, even if the internal aﬀairs division of a police department has
presented suﬃcient evidence to convince members of a civilian review board
to suspend or terminate an oﬃcer for conduct inconsistent with departmental
regulations, many jurisdictions provide this oﬃcer with an opportunity to
circumvent the decision by the civilian review board entirely and relitigate
the matter anew before an arbitrator. For example, in New Haven, the police
union contract permits oﬃcers to appeal disciplinary action to an arbitrator,
who is tasked with the responsibility of conducting a “de novo hearing” in
order to determine “whether said discharge or discipline was for just cause”
as required by the contract.187 The contract further clariﬁes that an arbitrator
is “empowered to receive evidence of alleged misconduct by the employee
involved, as well as any defense, denial, or other evidence controverting or
concerning such allegation . . . .”188

181 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Anchorage Police Department Employees and
Municipality of Anchorage 10-12, 16 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (stating that management may
punish oﬃcers for just cause, and then giving arbitrator wide latitude to review any apparent
violation of the collective bargaining agreement on appeal).
182 Labor Agreement Between the Government of the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department and the Fraternal Order of Police MPD Labor Committee, 11 (stating that
employees may appeal adverse action, deﬁned as a ﬁne, suspension, demotion, or termination, to
arbitration; further explaining that, during this arbitration, while the arbitrator should rely on the
record from the hearing below, the arbitrator may re-review any evidentiary ruling, or other evidence
improperly excluded from the earlier proceeding).
183 Agreement Between City of Orlando and Orlando Lodge #25, Fraternal Order of Police,
Inc. 2, 18-21 (2016) (on ﬁle with author) (stating that all discharges and punishments must be for
just cause, and further providing an arbitrator on appeal with the power to provide any remedy
necessary using a wide range of evidence).
184 Agreement Between the City of Albany, New York and the Albany Police Oﬃcers Union
Local 2841, Law Enforcement Oﬃcers Union Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Patrol Unit, at 11
(2008) (on ﬁle with author) (stating that an arbitrator on appeal has the power to re-adjudicate guilt
or innocence and can redecide this factual question based on a preponderance of evidence standard,
with the burden on the employer).
185 An Agreement By and Between City of Danville, Illinois and Policemen’s Benevolent and
Protective Association, Unit #11, at 6, 8-9 (2015) (on ﬁle with author) (limiting management to only
punishing oﬃcers for just cause and giving arbitrator the power on appeal to re-adjudicate whether
just cause existed for punishment through the grievance process).
186 Agreement Between the City of New Haven and the New Haven Police Union Local 530,
and Council 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 4 (2011) (on ﬁle with author) (providing for de novo review
of appeals to determine whether there was just cause for discharge or discipline).
187 Id.
188 Id.
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This stands in stark contrast to the limited role of appeals in the American
criminal and civil justice system. As Professor Martin B. Louis observed, “[i]n
America, appellate courts almost never decide cases de novo.”189 While
American appellate courts generally have the authority to re-review legal
determinations made at the trial level, appellate courts will typically defer to
factual determinations made at the trial level.190 Thus, the “primary function”
of appellate courts is to review for legal errors made at the trial level.191 Factual
determinations are not always outside of the review authority of appellate
courts. But appellate courts regularly adopt deferential standards when
reviewing pure factual determinations made by a trial judge or jury.192
This is not to say that appeals of disciplinary actions ought to mirror
appeals in our justice system. In adjudicating disciplinary actions, most police
departments do not employ procedures as rigorous as the Constitution
demands in both civil and criminal trials. And rarely do these disciplinary
hearings employ something akin to a civil or criminal jury as a decisionmaker. Thus, police oﬃcers may argue that de novo review on appeal provides
an important check on unfair, arbitrary, or capricious punishments.
Nevertheless, an expansive or de novo standard of review on appeal may
insulate officers from democratic accountability. It diminishes the ability of
police supervisors, city officials, and civilian review boards to reform police
departments. Such an expansive standard of review on appeal means that
most officers will be highly incentivized to appeal any disciplinary sanction
to arbitration. And given that most jurisdictions make the arbitrator’s
determination binding on all parties, it is the final word on certain classes
of disciplinary action. This effectively means that any earlier disciplinary
action taken against a police officer by a city official, police supervisor, or
civilian review board is somewhat symbolic. Significant power sits with the
arbitrator on appeal.

189 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion,
64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993 (1986).
190 Admittedly, “[t]hese nicely compartmentalized separations of law from fact and trial level
functions from appellate functions belie more complex distinctions . . . .” So-called “[u]ltimate
facts,” where a trial court applies “historical facts found” at trial to “relevant general legal principles”
combine law and fact and do not ﬁt nicely into this dichotomy. Id. at 994.
191 Id. at 993.
192 Id. at 995; see also Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries:
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 72 (1944) (“Determinations of administrative
bodies, judges, and juries on the ‘facts’ are treated by reviewing courts with considerable, though
varying, degrees of, respect.”).
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D. Eﬀects of Procedure on Outcomes of Disciplinary Appeals
Combined, it appears that a large majority of American police
departments provide officers with similar procedural protections during
disciplinary appeals. When layered on top of one another, these procedural
protections may combine to frustrate democratic accountability efforts.
Even so, it is important to recognize the limitations of these findings. This
Article cannot definitively claim to show that these procedural protections
help officers avoid punishment.
Despite this empirical limitation, there is a growing body of evidence
to suggest that the disciplinary appeals process described in this Article
may frequently impede police accountability. As discussed briefly in Part
II, Kelly, Lowery, and Rich at the Washington Post have conducted the most
comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of disciplinary appeals on
officer termination and rehiring practices.193 Recall that these reporters
acquired data on the number of officers rehired on appeal after
termination for misconduct across thirty-seven large American law
enforcement agencies.194 They found that 451 of the 1,881 police officers
fired by these agencies between 2006 and 2017 were ultimately ordered
rehired on appeal, normally by arbitrators.195 Table 3 reproduces the data
from the Washington Post study, showing the number of total officers fired
and rehired during this time period.196

Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
One immediate question that emerges from an analysis of the Washington Post data is
whether the type of appellate procedures given to oﬃcers predicts the frequency of oﬃcers being
rehired on appeal. A preliminary examination suggests there is no correlation between these two
phenomena. This does not, however, suggest that the types of procedures oﬀered to an oﬃcer on
appeal have no eﬀect on appellate outcomes.
For one thing, we should not assume that police supervisors, civilian review boards, and other
initial adjudicators of police discipline exercise their authority evenly across all jurisdictions. It may
be that some police departments routinely seek excessive or unjustiﬁable punishment against oﬃcers
in cases of alleged misconduct. In such cases, we would want oﬃcers to receive frequent relief on
appeal. So for example, the fact that 70.45% of terminated police oﬃcers in San Antonio are rehired
on appeal may be the result of the procedures used on appeal, or it may be because the City of San
Antonio has a history of excessively seeking oﬃcer terminations when a lesser punishment is more
justiﬁable. There is simply no way to know from the available data.
193
194
195
196
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Table 3: Frequency of Disciplinary Appeals Resulting in the Rehiring of
Terminated Oﬃcers, 2006–2017
Total
Fired

Total
Rehired

Percent
Rehired

Atlanta Police Department
Austin Police Department
Boston Police Department
Broward County, FL Sheriﬀ ’s Oﬃce
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
Chicago Police Department
Columbus Division of Police
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
Dallas Police Department
Denver Police Department
Detroit Police Department
Fort Worth Police Department
Harris County, TX Sheriﬀ ’s Oﬃce
Honolulu Police Department
Houston Police Department
Jacksonville, FL Sheriﬀ ’s Oﬃce
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Memphis Police Department
Metropolitan Nashville Police
Department
Miami Police Department
Miami-Dade Police Department
Milwaukee Police Department
Oklahoma City Police Department
Orange County, CA Sheriff’s Department

87
30
14
64
22
103
23
86
120
31
37
53
143
33
107
64
59
84
44

7
4
4
13
7
10
2
39
32
21
5
6
29
19
24
2
14
22
14

8.05%
13.33%
28.57%
20.31%
31.82%
9.71%
8.70%
45.35%
26.67%
67.74%
13.51%
11.32%
20.28%
57.58%
22.4%
3.13%
23.73%
26.19%
31.82%

28
101
57
15
43

8
38
11
6
6

28.57%
37.62%
19.30%
40.00%
13.95%

Orange County, FL Sheriﬀ ’s Oﬃce
Palm Beach, FL County Sheriﬀ ’s Oﬃce
Philadelphia Police Department
Phoenix Police Department
Prince George’s County, MD Police
Department
Riverside County, CA Sheriff’s Department

28
31
71
37

0
1
44
15

0.00%
3.23%
61.97%
40.54%

58

1

1.72%

109

7

6.42%

Department
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Sacramento County, CA Sheriﬀ ’s
Department
San Antonio Police Department
San Francisco Police Department
Santa Clara County, CA Sheriﬀ ’s
Department
Seattle Police Department
Suﬀolk County, NY Police Department

3

0

0.00%

44
11

31
0

70.45%
0.00%

8

0

0.00%

19
9

4
4

21.05%
44.44%

This data provides valuable insight into the outcomes of disciplinary
appeals. It suggests that the disciplinary appeals process as currently
constructed results in the reduction or reversal of disciplinary sanctions in a
large number of police departments. Just under a quarter (twenty-four
percent) of all oﬃcers terminated for misconduct in large American police
departments are eventually rehired because of the disciplinary appeals
process. This analysis, though, only focuses on the rehiring of terminated
oﬃcers. While only around ten percent of terminated Chicago police oﬃcers
were ordered rehired on appeal according to the data obtained by the
Washington Post, a separate analysis by Jennifer Smith Richards of the Chicago
Tribune and Jodi S. Cohen of ProPublica found that, between 2010 and 2017,
the City of Chicago has reduced or reversed sanctions against eighty-ﬁve
percent of all police oﬃcers during the grievance appeals process.197 So, if
anything, the Washington Post data likely underrepresents the number of
oﬃcers that receive some sort of relief during disciplinary appeals.
This raises a difficult normative question. How often should we expect
police disciplinary decisions to be overturned or reduced on appeal? There is no
easy answer to this question. Theoretically, appellate success ought to vary by
department. In police departments that are prone to arbitrary, excessive, or
unreasonable disciplinary decisions, we may want arbitrators to overturn or
reduce disciplinary decisions frequently. As a normative matter though, it seems
independently problematic if the appeals process results in the systematic
overturning of just decisions made by democratically accountable actors.
Unfortunately, this Article cannot prove that these procedural protections
cause an unreasonable number of police disciplinary cases to be overturned
or reduced on appeal. The narrow focus of this Article can only claim to build
a descriptive account of the procedural process utilized during disciplinary
appeals in a large cross section of American police departments. In doing so,
197 Jennifer Smith Richards & Jodi S. Cohen, Cop Disciplinary System Undercut, C HI .
T RIB . (Dec. 14, 2017), http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?
guid=bc73d166-b1f0-4d8b-9ff9-0529bad5bd7a [https://perma.cc/G2YH-L7N3].
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it shows that American police departments provide oﬃcers with a remarkably
consistent package of procedural protections during disciplinary appeals. The
ﬁndings from this study are certainly consistent with the hypothesis that the
procedures used during disciplinary appeals may contribute to the high rate
of reversals or reductions in punishments. Nevertheless, more research is
needed to conﬁrm this hypothesis.198
E. Implications for Police Reform Eﬀorts
The findings from this Article have significant implications for the study
of police reform. First, these findings suggest that arbitrators wield even more
authority in internal disciplinary matters than many policing scholars have
previously recognized. In fact, arbitrators are the true adjudicators of internal
discipline in many police departments in this Article’s dataset—even in
agencies that employ civilian review apparatuses designed to increase public
participation in police disciplinary matters. A recent study by Udi Ofer found
that twenty-four of the nation’s largest fifty police departments use civilian
review boards to oversee certain police disciplinary matters.199 Commentators
like Ofer generally point to civilian review boards as examples of communities
empowering the public with meaningful oversight of police conduct.
The findings from this Article suggest that some civilian review boards—even
robust ones with full investigative, subpoena, and disciplinary authority—may be
somewhat symbolic in their functional importance. Ofer’s study identifies Detroit
198 As a preliminary matter, it may be useful to consider the frequency that litigants receive
relief on appeal in the court system. One study published in 2015 found that, of the 69,348 estimated
criminal appeals in state court, around 8,226 (11.9%) were reversed, remanded, or modiﬁed. NICOLE
WATERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN STATE COURTS 1 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf [https://perma.cc/C76P-MQKT]. Thus, it seems safe
to say that police oﬃcers may more frequently receive relief than other litigants in the American
justice system, despite not being nearly as limited by the exclusionary rule, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and other procedural hurdles that can contribute to reversals in the federal system. More
research is needed on this point.
199 Ofer, supra note 38, at 1041-43. Ofer also provides an excellent discussion of the history of
civilian review boards and makes some important normative recommendations on how communities
could improve the structure of civilian review boards to ensure long-term stability and independence.
As Ofer explains, Washington, D.C. and New York were two of the earliest adopters of civilian
reviews, establishing some sort of civilian oversight boards in 1948 and 1953, respectively. In both
cases, though, city officials eventually dismantled these early civilian review boards after “intense
lobbying” by police unions. The concept of civilian oversight of police departments would not go
mainstream until the 1960s and 1970s, when highly publicized incidents of police brutality, combined
with the civil rights movement, led to more widespread implementation of civilian oversight
structures. Id. at 1040-41; see also Samuel Walker, The History of the Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN
OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1, 8 (Justina Cintron Perino ed., 2006) (“What
brought about this profound change in public attitudes? There have been no academic studies of this
question, but the evidence suggests a broad change in public attitudes toward official misconduct.”).
Today, there are over 100 civilian review boards across the country. Ofer, supra note 38, at 1041.
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as a community with one of the nation’s most unique and powerful civilian review
boards, referred to as the Detroit Police Commission, compromised of seven
members elected from each police district and four members selected by the
Mayor with the approval of the City Council.200 The Detroit Police Commission
has the authority to subpoena information during investigations201 and the ability
to discipline officers.202 Detroit is one of a few large cities in the United States
that gives a civilian review board such extensive authority, matched by Chicago,
Milwaukee, Newark, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.203 It would seem that
Detroit is a model of civilian control over police disciplinary investigations.
And yet, Detroit’s union contract establishes an appeals process that, in
some cases, allows arbitrators on appeal to overrule decisions made by the
Detroit Police Commission.204 The police union has a signiﬁcant role in
selecting the identity of this third-party arbitrator.205 The arbitrator’s
decision is ﬁnal and binding on all parties.206 And based on the terms of the
union contract, it appears that this arbitrator has de novo authority to reexamine whether just cause existed for the punishment.207 So while the
Detroit Police Commission seems to make civilians the primary adjudicators
of internal discipline for police oﬃcers, this is an illusion. The ultimate power
resides with an appellate arbitrator.208 And Detroit is not unique. This same

Ofer, supra note 38, at 1055 app.
See id. at 1043 (“[T]he only review board that has a leadership structure that is not majority
nominated by the mayor and that is empowered with subpoena, disciplinary, and policy review
authorities, is Detroit’s.”).
202 See id. (“[S]ome form of disciplinary authority remains relatively rare, with only six civilian
review boards having it—Chicago, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Newark.”).
203 See id. at 1053-62 (showing that all of these cities have the authority described above).
204 See City of Detroit, supra note 158, at 11-16, (establishing the right of the department to
punish only for just cause; providing details on the disciplinary process; further describing the
appellate process, including expedited arbitration for suspensions of more than three days in length).
205 See id. at 11-12 (permitting two methods for selecting an arbitrator: an existing panel of
acceptable arbitrators, or an alternative striking system whereby the union gets a say in the identity
of the arbitrator as the city management).
206 See id. at 13 (stating that the arbitrator’s decision “shall be ﬁnal and binding on the
Association, on all bargaining unit members, and on the Department”).
207 Id. at 11-13 (appearing to provide the arbitrator with the general authority to determine if
any disciplinary action violates the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which requires just
cause, and seemingly giving the arbitrator wide authority to hear evidence from both sides with little
deference to any decisions made by the Police Commission).
208 To elaborate further, this ﬁnding may even suggest that, in most American police
departments, up-front disciplinary mechanisms like civilian review boards act more akin to internal
prosecutors. They can bring charges against police oﬃcers for misconduct, but the ﬁnal authority
on disciplinary actions generally rests with third-party arbitrators. If true, this would upend the
traditional narrative of police reform articulated by many scholars, which emphasizes the importance
of departmental leadership dedicated to constitutional policing. Further, if we hope to promote
constitutional policing, police departments need leadership within a police department that
rigorously investigates and responds to alleged oﬃcer wrongdoing. But this, in itself, will often be
200
201
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general pattern holds in other large American cities with seemingly robust
civilian review boards, like Chicago209 and Milwaukee.210
Second, if police disciplinary appeals frequently lead to arbitrators
overturning termination decisions, this has worrisome downstream effects
for police reform efforts, in part because of the U.S. Supreme Court holding
in Brady v. Maryland.211 There, the Court held that prosecutors must disclose
material evidence that is favorable to the defense, including anything known
to any member of the prosecution team.212 As Jonathan Abel has described
in detail, evidence of prior misconduct by police officers can be critical pieces
of Brady material.213 This is particularly true when the evidence of
misconduct suggests that the officer has a history of dishonesty,214 theft,215
false police reports,216 or other wrongdoing that calls into question the
officer’s credibility as a witness. This has forced some police departments to
develop Brady lists—databases of officers who have previously committed
acts of misconduct that must be disclosed to defense counsel in criminal
cases to avoid violating the Brady decision.217 Officers placed on such Brady
lists generally “cannot make arrests, investigate cases, or conduct any other
police work that might lead to the witness stand,” because if they do, the
defense counsel will have access to records of the officer’s prior misconduct

insuﬃcient. Supervisors within a police department must then navigate a complex disciplinary
appeals process that is structured to insulate oﬃcers from public accountability.
209 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 17-18, 84-85 (laying out the ground rules of
arbitrations of appeals of disciplinary suspensions, including a designated panel of arbitrators
selected via the collective bargaining process, making the arbitration procedure “ﬁnal and binding,”
and seemingly granting the arbitrator wide authority).
210 See City of Milwaukee, supra note 165, at 7-14 (describing the appellate procedure for some
types of disciplinary matters, which includes “ﬁnal and binding arbitration” of disciplinary actions,
grants the Association signiﬁcant authority to select the arbitrator, and gives the arbitrator wide,
seemingly de novo authority).
211 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
212 Id. at 87-88; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (further clarifying Brady
to make clear that evidence known to the prosecution team must be disclosed).
213 Abel, supra note 41, at 745-47.
214 See Fields v. State, 69 A.3d 1104, 1110 (Md. 2013) (examining two detectives accused of
deceiving law enforcement supervisors by “submitting fraudulent, daily and court overtime slips”).
215 See United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 2010) (involving police oﬃcers
using “buy money” for personal purchases).
216 See Miller v. City of Ithaca, 914 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing a police oﬃcer
under investigation for falsifying details of vehicle stops in his reports).
217 Abel, supra note 41, at 780. Additionally, as Professor Rachel Moran has observed, these
Brady lists may only exist in some (perhaps even a minority) of police departments. In other
jurisdictions with laws protecting the conﬁdentiality of police records, prosecutors and defense
attorneys may be unable to get access to these records. See generally Rachel Moran, Contesting Police
Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339 (2018) (discussing the legal barriers that exist to accessing
evidence regarding a police oﬃcer’s credibility, particularly in contrast to comparable evidence
regarding a defendant).
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for impeachment purposes.218 Abel states that such officers “would be well
advised to start looking for a new profession,” because they can no longer
perform the basic functions of a law enforcement officer.219
But the ﬁndings from this Article present a diﬀerent, and especially
problematic, possibility. Because of the disciplinary appeals process, many
police departments may be unable to terminate the employment of these socalled “Brady cops.”220 Instead, departments may be forced to utilize limited
resources employing a police oﬃcer who cannot engage in any policing
function that may lead to testimony before a court.221 To accomplish this,
many police departments have shuﬄed staﬀ and reassigned rehired oﬃcers,
so as to minimize their involvement in criminal cases.222 This can drive up
the cost of public safety services, not to mention limit the ability of a police
chief to bring about real reform within an agency.
Third, this Article’s ﬁndings bolster the hypothesis that police union
contract negotiations may be susceptible to regulatory capture. In the past, I
have observed that police union contract negotiations often happen outside
of public view.223 Police unions are powerful political constituencies.224 Some
communities have little in the way of resources to satisfy union demands for
higher salaries and more generous beneﬁts.225 And virtually all municipalities
218 Abel, supra note 41, at 746.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 785-86.
221 See id. at 785 (“This can create

a diﬃcult situation for police management, which may ﬁnd
itself stuck with an oﬃcer who cannot testify because the prosecutor does not trust her, but who also
cannot be terminated because the oﬃcer fought oﬀ her termination through arbitration.”).
222 See, e.g., Pauline Repard, The Secret List That Police Officers Don’t Want You to See, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/
sd-me-brady-notebook-20170823-story.html [https://perma.cc/38ZR-TTRU] (describing the use of
Brady lists for oﬃcers still on the force in San Diego after serious incidents of misconduct); see also
Craig Cheatham, Dan Monk, Joe Rosemeyer, & Brian Niesz, Can Police Oﬃcers Still Serve After
They’re Caught Being Dishonest?, WCPO CINCINNATI (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.wcpo.com/
longform/i-team-investigation-can-officers-still-serve-after-theyre-caught-being-dishonest
[https://perma.cc/B2M2-6BK6] (providing data on the number of officers serving in
Cincinnati after apparent dishonesty).
223 See Rushin, supra note 30, at 1213 (“[T]here are thousands of decentralized police
departments in the United States, and each negotiates its own collective bargaining agreements,
largely outside public view.”).
224 See, e.g., Lee Fang, Maryland Cop Lobbyists Helped Block Reforms Just Last Month, INTERCEPT
(Apr. 28, 2015, 9:42 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/04/28/baltimore-freddie-gray-prosecute
[https://perma.cc/DKU9-FZLV] (detailing how police unions eﬀectively blocked various reforms in
Maryland); see also Michael Tracey, The Police Lobby Has Far Too Much Power in American Politics,
VICE (Dec. 4, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nnqyeg/the-pernicious-powerof-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5BDZ-3DZG] (describing the political power of police unions).
225 See John Chase & David Heinzmann, Cops Traded Away Pay for Protection in Police
Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016, 8:36 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-chicago-police-contracts-fop-20160520-story.html [https://perma.cc/5ZLK-ZP6U]
(describing how, in Chicago, the city traded off lower salaries for more generous disciplinary protections).
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negotiate salaries, beneﬁts, and disciplinary procedures as part of the same
private negotiation.226 Under these conditions, I have hypothesized that
municipal leaders may be incentivized to oﬀer concessions to police unions
on disciplinary procedures in exchange for lower oﬃcer salaries.227 A number
of anecdotal cases suggest that such tradeoﬀs are commonplace.228 This
Article provides further evidence that collective bargaining agreements can
serve as a barrier to oﬃcer accountability—this time through the elaboration
of extensive appellate protections for oﬃcers found guilty of misconduct.
Fourth, these findings have important implications for the literature on
police officer decertification. Professor Roger Goldman has argued that “states
can deter police misconduct by decertification of the officer, that is, by revoking
the officer’s state certification for constitutional violations in evidence
gathering.”229 All states other than Hawaii have some type of state-wide agency,
typically known as a Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission
(POST), that can hold hearings and sanction officers engaged in sufficiently
serious misconduct, as defined by the requisite state statute.230 And the vast
majority of state POSTs have the statutory authority to not only sanction
officers but actually strip them of their legal ability to work as police officers in
the state.231 This process, referred to by various names including
decertification, cancellation, or revocation may be “the most common state
legislative and administrative approach for addressing police misconduct” even
if it is “largely unknown to scholars and the public.”232
The story surrounding the death of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice illustrates
the importance of this police accountability mechanism. Immediately after
the killing, Cleveland oﬃcials learned that the oﬃcer involved “hid the fact
that he had an ‘emotional breakdown’ during the state qualiﬁcation course,
and that his former employer” terminated his employment after concluding

226 See Rushin, supra note 30, at 1245 (“As currently structured, most municipalities negotiate
with police unions about disciplinary procedures alongside salaries, benefits, vacation time,
promotion procedures, and more.”).
227 Id. at 1245-46.
228 See, e.g., Chase & Heinzmann, supra note 225.
229 Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 47 (1987); see also Roger Goldman, A
Model Decertification Law, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 147 (2012) (oﬀering a model law for
regulating police decertiﬁcation).
230 Legislators Seek More Law Enforcement Oversight, HAW. NEWS NOW (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/31193633/hawaii-only-state-in-the-country-with-no-law-enforcementstandards-board [https://perma.cc/MV4X-3Z3T].
231 See Goldman & Puro, supra note 50, at 542 (explaining that at least forty-three states have
the power to revoke oﬃcer certiﬁcation).
232 Id. at 542-43.
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that “he was unable ‘to emotionally function.’”233 The oﬃcer’s failure to
disclose his previous ﬁring gave Cleveland oﬃcials grounds to terminate his
employment.234 But the oﬃcer ultimately did not face criminal penalties.235
Under Ohio state law, an oﬃcer can only face decertiﬁcation for a felony
conviction or a felony that is pleaded down to a misdemeanor.236 As a result,
the oﬃcer maintained his license to work as a police oﬃcer in Ohio and was
hired by another police department in October of 2018.237 This incident
illustrates that decertiﬁcation is only eﬀective if POSTs are legislatively
empowered to decertify oﬃcers aggressively when their behavior
demonstrates their lack of ﬁtness to serve as a law enforcement oﬃcer.
This realization raises several important questions regarding police
disciplinary appeals and decertification that have received insufficient attention
in the existing literature. If an arbitrator overturns or reduces a penalty against
an officer found responsible for serious misconduct, can a POST still decertify
that officer? Or do the police disciplinary appeals effectively insulate officers
from legislatively enacted decertification procedures? It appears that state
POSTs have taken different positions on this issue.238
If outside arbitrators frequently order the rehiring of problematic oﬃcers,
a state may need to consider whether its POST should nonetheless be
statutorily authorized to conduct decertiﬁcation hearings to protect the
public from an individual that may nonetheless be unﬁt to carry out the duties
of a sworn peace oﬃcer.

233 Saﬁa Samee Ali, Fired Oﬃcer Who Shot Tamir Rice Could Be Back at Another Department,
NBC NEWS (June 2, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ﬁred-oﬃcer-who-shot-tamirrice-could-be-back-another-n766921 [https://perma.cc/DBV9-8JDP].
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Matthew Haag, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Is Hired by an Ohio Police Department, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/timothy-loehmann-tamir-rice-shooting.html.
238 Some state POSTs, like Washington, cannot decertify an oﬃcer if an arbitrator on appeal
reverses the oﬃcer’s termination. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.105(d) (2012) (providing that
oﬃcer discharge can be the basis for a decertiﬁcation, but only if the discharge is ﬁnalized). POSTs
in other states, like Arizona, maintain the ability to decertify oﬃcers even if a disciplinary penalty
is overturned on appeal. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1822(C)(1) (2001) (describing how the
state agency may conduct an independent investigation that may result in decertiﬁcation based on
any complaint it receives). For more information on the variation in state decertification policies, see
RAYMOND A. FRANKLIN, POLICE OFFICER CERTIFICATION REVOCATION INFO. SHARING: NAT’L
PUB. SAFETY OFFICER DECERTIFICATION DATABASE, 2005 SURVEY OF POST AGENCIES
REGARDING CERTIFICATION PRACTICES (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/grants/213048.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9NA-EPGY].
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V. REFORMING POLICE DISCIPLINARY APPEALS
Police need basic procedural protections against arbitrary and capricious
punishment. This includes the ability to appeal disciplinary action. At the
same time, these appellate procedures should not allow oﬃcers to circumvent
democratic oversight or otherwise thwart reasonable accountability eﬀorts.
This Article shows that virtually all police departments give oﬃcers multiple
layers of appellate review, often culminating in binding arbitration. In most
cases, the police union has some substantial role in selecting the identity of
the arbitrator. And in most of these cases, the arbitrator is given expansive
authority to relitigate all decisions made by police supervisors, city oﬃcials,
and civilian review boards.
While each of these appellate procedures may be individually defensible,
they could theoretically combine to create a formidable barrier to
accountability. These procedural protections may be problematic to the extent
that they limit the ability of supervisors to punish or terminate problematic
oﬃcers responsible for serious misconduct. Additionally, these protections
may be troubling because they limit the role of the public in overseeing local
law enforcement. Prior scholars have argued that “democratic deliberation
around policing is an imperative,” as it ensures that oﬃcers are accountable
to the people they serve.239
Thus, this Part considers how the states and localities could reform the
disciplinary appeals process in American police departments in a manner that
balances officers’ need for procedural protections against arbitrary punishment
with a community’s need for democratic oversight and accountability.
A. Democratizing Disciplinary Appeals
In my previous work, I have defended the importance of democratic
participation and transparency in the development of internal disciplinary
procedures in police departments.240 I am hardly the ﬁrst to make such a
claim. Prior studies have found that, without substantial democratic
participation in the development of police policies, departments can become
insular and unresponsive to community needs.241
239 Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1837,
1907 (2015). Professors Friedman and Ponomarenko found that democratic accountability is
generally lacking, often without suﬃcient justiﬁcation in the world of policing. Id. at 1843-45.
240 See generally Rushin, supra note 30 (arguing in favor of more public involvement in the
development of police union contracts in hopes of preventing regulatory capture).
241 See, e.g., Christopher E. Stone & Heather Ward, Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action,
10 POLICING & SOC’Y 11, 12 (2000) (posing the question, “How can police agencies create internal
discipline necessary to advance public safety while treating people with respect?” and stating that
this “question is as old as democratic theory”).
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Scholars often disagree about the extent to which policing ought to be
responsive to democratic pressures, particularly in the adjudication of
disciplinary cases. For example, Professor Christopher E. Stone and Heather
Ward have shown how policing advocates have widely varying opinions about
where best to situate police disciplinary authority.242 Police chiefs may argue
that oﬃcer disciplinary decisions ought to rest in their hands alone, in order
to ensure a “straight, hierarchical line” of accountability within a police
department.243 Critics of such an alignment may point out that, while police
chiefs are normally subject to ﬁring by democratically accountable actors like
mayors or city councils, this doesn’t always work in practice.244 As a result,
some policing experts support more direct forms of democratic accountability
in police disciplinary matter, like civilian review boards that better
incorporate the opinions of generally unrepresented minorities.245
Regardless of where experts fall in this debate,246 there is nearly uniform
agreement that the development of police policies and oﬃcer oversight
should not be divorced from community input.247 This Article does not tackle
the larger question of how communities ought to balance the need for
democratic oversight and due process in the adjudication of internal
disciplinary matters. Instead, it makes a narrower observation. The data
presented in this Article suggests that the disciplinary appeals process in
many departments is largely devoid of democratic participation.
If communities want to modestly reform the existing disciplinary appeals
process so as to better facilitate democratic accountability, there are several
ways they could do this. One of the most eﬀective, and likely controversial,
ways that communities could accomplish this is by entirely eliminating
arbitration of disciplinary appeals. In its place, communities could vest
Id.
Id. at 17.
See id. (citing the Los Angeles Police Department as an example).
Id. at 17-18.
In fact, as Stone and Ward point out, most experts do not believe that we must choose
one model of democratic oversight or another. This need not be a “Hobson’s choice.” Instead we
generally recognize that “police in a democracy must be accountable simultaneously to multiple
levels of control.” Id. at 13.
247 Admittedly, there is disagreement between scholars on how democratic accountability
ought to work in police departments, even if there is some uniformity in the belief that democratic
accountability is an important value in police oversight generally. See, e.g., Friedman and
Ponomarenko, supra note 239 (arguing generally for the value of democratic accountability in
policing); Rushin, supra note 30 (supporting additional democratic involvement in the development
of disciplinary procedures); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2010) (arguing for
better democratic incorporation of stakeholder interests in police reform eﬀorts); David A. Sklansky,
Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (discussing the complex relationship between
police, criminal procedural, and democratic theory).
242
243
244
245
246
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appellate review authority in more democratically accountable actors, like city
councils, mayors, city managers, or civilian review boards. A number of
communities already do this, like Fountain Valley, California248 or Lincoln,
Nebraska.249 This may allow internal disciplinary responses by local police
departments to reﬂect community values more accurately.
As an alternative, communities could make appellate arbitrations
advisory, or at least provide an opportunity for city leaders to overturn
particularly egregious decisions by arbitrators. Some cities provide such
procedures on appeal. These include Peoria, Arizona,250 as well as many cities
in California, including Buena Park,251 Burbank,252 Cathedral City,253 Costa
Mesa,254 Delano,255 Fullerton,256 Indio,257 Ontario,258 Oxnard,259 and

248 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Fountain Valley and the Fountain
Valley Police Oﬃcers’ Association 36-37 (2014) (on ﬁle with author) (providing oﬃcers the right to
appeal disciplinary action to the police chief and then the city manager, and providing a limited
option under municipal code for oﬃcers to challenge the city manager’s ﬁnal decision to city council
under certain exceptional circumstances).
249 See Agreement Between Lincoln Police Union and the City of Lincoln, Nebraska 16-17
(2016) (on ﬁle with author) (permitting appeal to city’s Personnel Board).
250 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Peoria and Peoria Police Officers
Association, Covering Police Officers Unit 23-24 (2013) (on file with author) (providing officers the chance
to bring a disciplinary grievance before an arbitrator as the third step in the grievance process, but then
allowing the police department to appeal an arbitrator’s grievance to the City Manager at step four).
251 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Buena Park, California and the
Buena Park Police Association 39-41, 57-59 (2016) (on file with author) (stipulating that arbitration
on appeal is merely advisory).
252 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Burbank and the Burbank Police
Officers’ Association 54-61 (2016) (on file with author) (establishing procedures for arbitration of
disciplinary appeals and providing that “[t]he decision of the arbitrator shall be solely advisory in nature”).
253 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Cathedral City and Cathedral City
Police Oﬃcer’s Association (CCPOA) 16-20 (2016) (on ﬁle with author) (explaining the procedures
for hearing oﬃcers to consider appeals by oﬃcers to disciplinary action, but stating explicitly that
the hearing oﬃcer’s decision is not binding; instead the “City Manager or designee mutually
agreeable to the City Manager and the employee shall review the Hearing Oﬃcer’s
recommendation, but shall not be bound thereby”).
254 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Representatives of the Costa Mesa Police
Association and the City of Costa Mesa 17-24 (2014) (on ﬁle with author) (establishing arbitration
procedures but vesting ﬁnal decision-making authority with the Chief Executive Oﬃcer).
255 See Agreement Between City of Delano and Delano Police Oﬃcers Association 6-8 (2017)
(on ﬁle with author) (authorizing advisory arbitration of disciplinary action).
256 See City of Fullerton, supra note 46, at 44 (placing the authority to review an arbitrator’s
decision in the hands of the city council).
257 See City of Indio, supra note 152, at 42-46 (allowing appellate arbitration but vesting final
authority in hands of city manager).
258 See Memorandum of Understanding Between Ontario Police Officers Association and City
of Ontario 30 (2014) (on file with author) (making arbitration awards subject to review by city council).
259 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oxnard and Oxnard Peace Oﬃcers’
Association 22 (2016) (on ﬁle with author) (permitting advisory arbitration).
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Pasadena.260 Officers may find this option more procedurally just, as it would
give them an opportunity to make their case before a third party that is
separate from city leadership. And city leaders would maintain the flexibility
to depart from decisions made by an arbitrator when it appears to run
counter to the public’s interest.
Or, if communities still want to use binding appellate arbitration in some
disciplinary cases, they could nonetheless increase the amount of democratic
accountability in this process by following the model of Oceanside,
California. There, the city’s police union contract permits oﬃcers to appeal
relatively minor disciplinary action to binding arbitration.261 But the contract
makes arbitration decisions merely advisory for serious misconduct resulting
in suspensions and terminations.262 Such a compromise would allow cities to
maintain the use of arbitration so as to avoid unfair punishments in some
cases, while maintaining the ability of city oﬃcials to protect the public
interest in police accountability in cases of serious misconduct where the
continued employment of the oﬃcer could pose a public safety risk.
Each of these options would give the public a greater role in overseeing
police disciplinary decisions and would give police and city leaders greater
latitude to circumvent some of the harmful, downstream effects of disciplinary
appeals procedures that currently insulate officers from punishment.
B. Limiting the Scope of Appellate Review
Police may understandably object to the proposals in the previous section
that remove or diminish the power of arbitrators in hopes of enhancing
democratic oversight of policing. Theoretically, arbitrators are neutral, third
parties who should not be indebted to either party during an appellate
procedure. This makes an arbitrator a natural choice to settle disputes
between police unions and city leadership on appeal. Indeed, this Article does
not take issue with the concept of arbitration. As I have already argued, many
of the procedures described in this Article are individually defensible.
Instead, it may be their combination that can create appellate procedures that
systematically beneﬁt oﬃcers at the expense of the community.
Thus, an alternative way that communities could improve the
disciplinary appeals process is by narrowing the scope of an arbitrator’s scope
260 See Amended and Restated Memorandum of Understanding Between Pasadena Police
Oﬃcers Association 41 (2017) (on ﬁle with author) (giving the Municipal Employee Relations
Oﬃcer the authority to accept, modify, or reject hearing decision on appeal).
261 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Oceanside and the Oceanside
Police Officers’ Association 30-35 (2017) (on file with author) (stating that appeals of non-suspensions
and non-terminations go to binding adjudication by “third party neutral,” but in other appeals,
decisions by third party neutrals will be “advisory”).
262 Id.
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of review. As discussed in Section IV.D, most communities allow arbitrators
to rehear cases effectively de novo. This means that they need not defer to
any decisions made by civilian review boards, police leaders, or city
leadership. Nevertheless, not all cities use this model. Some cities explicitly
limit the authority of arbitration on appeal.
For example, Fullerton, California permits advisory arbitration on appeal,
but bars an arbitrator from overruling or modifying punishment handed
down against an oﬃcer unless the arbitrator ﬁnds the punishment to be
“arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable.”263 This
standard of review on appeal is far more favorable to city leaders than that
used in a majority of the cities in this dataset. Fullerton’s standard of review
is similar to that used by Bloomington, Illinois, which states that suspensions
should “be upheld unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the
needs of the service.”264 Eugene, Oregon similarly limits the authority of the
arbitrator to review disciplinary matter de novo by only empowering them to
determine whether the city’s actions were “reasonably consistent with City
and departmental guidelines.”265
Alternatively, communities could limit arbitrators from altering
punishment in cases where the facts support a ﬁnding of guilt. This is the
case in Grand Rapids, Michigan, where an arbitrator on appeal can overturn
a decision made by the city, but cannot reduce punishment in cases where
there is evidence to support the allegation of misconduct.266 Similarly, the
policy in Ocala, Florida states that an arbitrator on appeal cannot question
the city’s judgment on the proper amount of punishment, provided that the
department has demonstrated “good cause for discipline.”267
By enacting similar limitations on the scope of review on appeal, states
and localities could maintain the use of arbitration while preventing these
appellate procedures from entirely displacing the role of police leaders, city
leaders, and civilian review boards. This would represent a positive step in
promoting democratic accountability in the police disciplinary appeals.
C. Possible Drawbacks
Police oﬃcers and unions may object to the proposals discussed in this
Article for several reasons. First, police oﬃcers and police unions may argue
City of Fullerton, supra note 46, at 45.
Agreement Between City of Bloomington, Illinois and Police Benevolent and Protective
Association, Unit No. 21, at 15 (2014) (on ﬁle with author).
265 Contract Between the City of Eugene and the Eugene Police Employees’ Association 45
(2016) (on file with author).
266 City of Grand Rapids, supra note 45, at 6.
267 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Ocala, Florida and Florida State
Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police 15 (2016) (on ﬁle with author).
263
264
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that the proposals in this Article would give police oﬃcers fewer procedural
protections during appeal than some other public servants. If civil servants
like ﬁre ﬁghters or teachers have similar appellate protections from
disciplinary action, why should we treat police oﬃcers diﬀerently?
While understandable, this argument ignores the fact that police work is
fundamentally different from the work of most public servants. As I have
previously argued, “[u]nlike other public employees, police officers generally
carry firearms, make investigatory stops, conduct arrests, and use lethal force
when needed.”268 Officers also encounter “people when they are both most
threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are
frightened, when they are desperate, when they are drunk, when they are
violent, or when they are ashamed.”269 We necessarily give police officers
considerable discretion in carrying out their job. With this discretion, there
is a heightened risk that officers will engage in misconduct. And unlike other
fields, misconduct by police officers “can leave [a] victim dead or
permanently damaged, and under the right circumstances one cop’s bad
call—or a group of cops’ habitual [bad behavior]—can be the spark that
leaves a city like Baltimore in flames.”270 Given these realities of modern
American policing, it is critical to ensure that police disciplinary procedures
reflect not just a respect for due process, but also a respect for the opinions
of the public that the police department serves.
Second, and relatedly, the removal or curtailing of arbitration provisions in
police disciplinary appeals may result in significant pushback by frontline
officers. Some officers may understandably argue that this would reduce job
security and hurt officer morale, making police work less appealing. There is at
least some empirical evidence to suggest that efforts to increase oversight and
accountability among police officers can result in union opposition, reduced
street-level enforcement of the law, and ultimately de-policing.271 While this is
a serious concern, it should not deter communities from establishing a
disciplinary appeals process that emphasizes democratic accountability.
Rushin, supra note 30, at 1248.
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdﬃles1/nij/42.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6N2N-QV49].
270 Ross Douthat, Our Police Union Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-our-police-union-problem.html [https://perma.cc/MD53-3GZZ].
271 See, e.g., Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 758-59
(2017) (finding that the introduction of federal intervention into American police departments to
reduce patterns of misconduct was associated with a statistically significant uptick in property crime
rates, and also noting that this uptick in crime was frontloaded in the years immediately after federal
intervention). But cf. Joshua Chanin & Brittany Sheats, Depolicing as Dissent Shirking: Examining the
Effects of Pattern or Practice Misconduct Reform on Police Behavior, 43 CRIM. JUST. REV. 105 (2019) (finding
that federal intervention did not result in reductions in arrests across a sample of test agencies).
268
269
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Virtually any policing regulation can inspire some pushback from frontline
officers. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that such pushback and
negative side effects are generally temporary in nature. Take, for example, the
pushback from police officers during cases of federal intervention pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 14141.272 The Department of Justice (DOJ), mostly under
Democratic presidents,273 has used this statute to force local police departments
into negotiated settlements to address patterns of unconstitutional or unlawful
misconduct.274 In many of these negotiated settlements, the DOJ has pressured
police departments to improve disciplinary oversight of officers.275 In response,
surveys have found that officers frequently complained about how these new
disciplinary measures caused them to be less proactive “because of [the] fear of
being unfairly disciplined.”276
Yet, empirical research has found that this sort of pushback and reduction
in morale did not have any long-term, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on arrest
or crime rates.277 Additionally, even if reforming disciplinary appeals does
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).
See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) (attributing the weakness in the enforcement of § 14141 to lack of political
commitment, particularly during the administration of President George W. Bush); Stephen
Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3232 ﬁg. 3 (2014) (showing
how the use of § 14141 has varied by presidential administration); Joshua M. Chanin, Negotiated
Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and Policy Implications of “Pattern or Practice” Police
Misconduct Reform 335 (July 6, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, American University),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdﬃles1/nij/grants/237957.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8BC-YVR8] (describing
structural changes during the George W. Bush administration that contributed to changes in
vigorousness of enforcement of § 14141).
274 See STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS
286-89, 103-59, 244-85 (2017) (providing a complete historical description of how the DOJ has
enforced § 14141 over time, listing the departments subject to DOJ reform since the statute’s passage
in 1994, and making recommendations for its improvement); Ivana Dukanovic, Reforming High-Stakes
Police Departments: How Federal Civil Rights Will Rebuild Constitutional Policing in America, 43
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 911 (2016) (providing in part a summary of existing DOJ work under § 14141
and the mechanisms strengths and weaknesses); Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 50,
at 1367-77 (providing a summary of how the DOJ has used § 14141 over time to bring about reform
in problematic police departments).
275 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 50, at 1378-87 (providing a summary of
the various portions of these negotiated settlements, including regulations of use of force, early
intervention and risk management systems, overhauls of complaint and investigation procedures,
new training procedures, measures to address bias in policing, and programs emphasizing
community policing).
276 See, e.g, C HRISTOPHER S TONE ET AL ., P OLICING L OS A NGELES U NDER A
C ONSENT D ECREE: T HE D YNAMICS OF C HANGE AT THE LAPD 19-20 (2009),
http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/V78Q-3JQL]
(finding that eighty-nine percent of officers believed that “because of fear of being unfairly
disciplined, many LAPD officers are not proactive in doing their jobs”).
277 See Chanin & Sheats, supra note 271, at 117-18 (finding no effect of federal intervention on arrest
rates); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 271, at 758-59 (finding that, if federal intervention did result in any
de-policing effect, it was mostly in terms of property crime rates, and this effect was frontloaded).
272
273
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have some negative eﬀects on oﬃcer morale, this may be a necessary cost to
ensure that police departments reﬂect the values of their constituents.
Democratic accountability is an independently important goal in policing, as
demonstrated by the widespread support for community policing initiatives,
even if it “may sometimes require compromise.”278
And third, some may argue that the disciplinary appeals process in American
police departments is exhaustive and undemocratic out of necessity because of
the arbitrary nature of earlier disciplinary proceedings. For example, Professor
Kate Levine’s important new work describes the current state of internal
discipline in American police departments as “uneven, arbitrary, and entirely
discretionary.”279 As evidence for this proposition, Professor Levine compares
the way that two different police departments—the Chicago Police Department
and the Philadelphia Police Department—reacted to officers claiming to
exercise their free speech rights while on duty.280 In Chicago, two black officers
received reprimands for taking a photograph with a civilian while kneeling in
support of Colin Kaepernick’s protest against police brutality.281 But in
Philadelphia, a white officer received no such punishment or reprimand for
displaying a tattoo of an eagle symbol allegedly used by the Nazi Party along
with the word “Fatherland.”282 Professor Levine cites the seemingly inconsistent
treatment of these officers across two major American police departments to
demonstrate the unpredictability of modern police discipline.
If we accept Professor Levine’s claim, then disciplinary appeals serve a
critically important role. The appeals process may protect oﬃcers from being
unfairly punished, particularly when unfair punishment is politically popular
or expedient. Oﬃcers may worry that increasing public involvement in

Rushin & Edwards, supra note 271, at 776.
Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 842 (2018).
See id. at 841-42 (summarizing these two vignettes and explaining that they “reﬂect the
state of internal discipline in police departments across the country”).
281 Tom Porter, Chicago Police Officers Disciplined for Taking a Knee in Solidarity with Colin
Kaepernick, N EWSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2017, 5:25 AM GMT), http://www.newsweek.com/
chicago-police-officers-discplined-taking-knee-solidarity-colin-kaepernick-670988 [https://perma.cc/
U5N9-NUKW]. The punishment happened after a civilian posted a picture of the event on
Instagram. The Chicago Police Spokesman stated that the department reprimanded the
officers for violating the city’s policy on political speech while in uniform.
282 John Kopp, Photos Surface of Philly Police Officer with Nazi Tattoo, PHILLY VOICE (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.phillyvoice.com/photos-surface-philly-police-officer-nazi-tattoo [https://perma.cc/37UB-6FD5]
(describing the public outrage to the tattoo and showing a picture of the oﬃcer “posing with fellow
Nazi reenactors”); John Kopp, Internal Affairs Investigation Clears Philly Police Officer with Apparent Nazi
Tattoo, PHILLY VOICE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.phillyvoice.com/internal-affairs-investigationclears-philly-police-officer-apparent-nazi-tattoo [https://perma.cc/4KJT-SRDX] (describing how an
Internal Affairs investigation concluded that the officer did not violate any departmental policy
by having the tattoo).
278
279
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disciplinary appeals will put oﬃcers at risk of being unfairly ﬁred or
disciplined, particularly in communities with bias against police oﬃcers.283
No doubt, police oﬃcers deserve adequate procedure protections during
internal disciplinary investigations. But none of the recommendations in this
Article would strip police of their due process right to appeal disciplinary
action. Instead, they would merely alter the current procedures used in some
police departments to ensure a heightened level of democratic engagement
and accountability in this process. Oﬃcers would retain the ability to
challenge arbitrary and capricious punishments and incorrect applications of
internal regulations. They would also still have the opportunity to bring such
appeals before a diﬀerent oversight body than that which levied the original
disciplinary decision, ensuring that no oﬃcer could face severe punishment
without multiple layers of oversight. And a number of police departments
across the country already employ many of the recommendations in this
Article. At a minimum, this demonstrates that these procedures represent a
feasible path forward.
CONCLUSION
Few stories better illustrate the importance of police disciplinary appeals
than that of an oﬃcer in Florida. An investigation by the Miami Herald found
that, over his nineteen year career, a single sergeant faced misconduct
accusations for allegedly “cracking the head of a handcuﬀed suspect, beating
juveniles, hiding drugs in his police car, stealing from suspects, defying direct
orders and lying and falsifying police reports.”284 At one point, he allegedly
called in sick to take a vacation to Cancún.285 He engaged in a series of police
chases that violated departmental policy, killing four civilians in the
process.286 He has been arrested and jailed multiple times.287 And his
employer has attempted to suspend and ﬁre him more than any other oﬃcer
in the state.288 Despite all of this, each attempt to ﬁre the sergeant has failed,
thanks in part to the disciplinary appeals process.

283 See generally H EATHER M AC D ONALD , T HE W AR ON C OPS : H OW THE N EW
A TTACK ON L AW AND O RDER M AKES E VERYONE L ESS S AFE (2016) (claiming,
controversially, that the current antipolice political environment causes police to reduce
aggressiveness, resulting in effects on crime rates).
284 Julie K. Brown, The South Florida Cop Who Won’t Stay Fired, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1940924.html [https://perma.cc/6M6J-TC7J].
285 Id.
286 Id. (describing how he “has engaged in a rash of unauthorized police chases, including one
in which four people were killed”).
287 Id.
288 Id. (explaining that the department has attempted to ﬁre him six times).
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All police officers, including the sergeant discussed above, deserve
adequate procedural protections during internal disciplinary investigations.
This should include the right to appeal disciplinary action. Nevertheless,
these disciplinary appeals procedures should not insulate officers from basic
accountability at the expense of the broader community. This is admittedly
a tough balance to strike. The findings from this Article, though, suggest
that some communities may be failing to strike a reasonable balance
between these two competing goals.
Many communities have established appeals procedures that may hamper
reform eﬀorts, contribute to oﬃcer misconduct, and limit public oversight of
police departments. Most of the agencies discussed in this study permit
oﬃcers to appeal disciplinary action to binding arbitration. Many agencies
allow the police union or the aggrieved oﬃcer to have a substantial role in
selecting the arbitrator. And agencies often give this arbitrator expansive
review authority that oﬀers no deference to decisions made by other
disciplinary agents, like civilian review boards, police chiefs, or city oﬃcials.
While each of these procedural protections may be individually defensible,
they may combine to create a formidable barrier to oﬃcer accountability.
Police departments need not eliminate all of these appellate protections.
But curtailing some of them, or transferring additional deference and authority
to democratically accountable accounts, could represent an incremental step in
ensuring that police officers are accountable to the communities they serve.
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APPENDIX A: AGENCIES STUDIED
City
Anchorage
Fairbanks
Juneau
Little Rock
Chandler
Glendale
Goodyear
Lake Havasu
Mesa
Peoria
Phoenix
Tempe
Tucson
Alameda
Anaheim
Antioch
Arcadia
Azusa
Bakersﬁeld
Baldwin Park
Berkeley
Brea
Brentwood
Buena Park
Burbank
Carlsbad
Cathedral City
Ceres
Chico
Chino
Chula Vista

State
AK
AK
AK
AR
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

City
Citrus Heights
Clovis
Colton
Concord
Corona
Costa Mesa
Culver City
Cypress
Daly City
Davis
Delano
Downey
El Cajon
El Monte
Elk Grove
Escondido
Fairﬁeld
Folsom
Fontana
Fountain Valley
Fremont
Fresno
Fullerton
Garden Grove
Gardena
Gilroy
Glendale
Glendora
Hanford
Hawthorne
Hayward

State
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
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City
Hemet
Huntington Beach
Huntington Park
Indio
Inglewood
Irvine
La Habra
La Mesa
Lincoln
Livermore
Lodi
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Madera
Manhattan Beach
Manteca
Menlo Park
Merced
Milpitas
Modesto
Monterey Park
Mountain View
Murrieta
Napa
National City
Newport Beach
Novato
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State
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

City
Petaluma
Pittsburg
Placentia
Pleasanton
Pomona
Redding
Redlands
Redondo Beach
Redwood City
Rialto
Richmond
Riverside
Rocklin
Roseville
Sacramento
Salinas
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
San Leandro
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
San Rafael
San Ramon
Santa Ana
Santa Barbara
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State
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

Oakland
Oceanside
Ontario
Orange
Oxnard
Palm Springs

CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Santa Maria
Santa Monica
Santa Rosa
Simi Valley

CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

Palo Alto
Pasadena

CA
CA

South Gate
South San Francisco

CA
CA
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City
Stockton
Sunnyvale
Torrance
Tracy
Tulare
Turlock
Tustin
Union City
Upland
Vacaville
Vallejo
Ventura
Visalia
Walnut Creek
Watsonville
West Covina
West Sacramento
Westminster
Whittier
Woodland
Yuba City
Aurora
Boulder
Commerce City
Denver
Fort Collins
Greeley

State
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO

City
Meriden
Middletown
Milford
Naugatuck
New Haven
Norwalk
Norwich
Stamford
Stratford
Torrington
Waterbury
West Hartford
District of Columbia
Dover
Newark
Wilmington
Aventura
Boca Raton
Boynton Beach
Bradenton
Cape Coral
Clearwater
Coconut Creek
Coral Gables
Coral Springs
Davie
Daytona Beach

State
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
DC
DE
DE
DE
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

Pueblo
Thornton
Bridgeport
Bristol
Fairﬁeld
Greenwich

CO
CO
CT
CT
CT
CT

Delray Beach
Doral
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Fort Pierce
Gainesville

FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

Hartford
Manchester

CT
CT

Greenacres
Hallandale

FL
FL
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City
Hialeah
Hollywood
Jacksonville
Jupiter
Kissimmee
Lakeland
Largo
Lauderhill
Margate
Melbourne
Miami
Miami Beach
Miami Gardens
Miramar
North Miami
North Miami Beach
Ocala
Ocoee
Orlando
Ormond Beach
Oviedo
Palm Bay
Palm Beach Gardens
Pembroke Pines
Pensacola
Plantation
Port Orange
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State
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

City
Ames
Ankeny
Bettendorf
Cedar Rapids
Council Bluﬀs
Davenport
Des Moines
Dubuque
Iowa City
Sioux City
West Des Moines
Boise
Pocatello
Addison
Algonquin
Arlington Heights
Aurora
Bartlett
Belleville
Berwyn
Bloomington
Bolingbrook
Buﬀalo Grove
Calumet City
Carol Stream
Carpentersville
Champaign

State
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
ID
ID
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL

Port St. Lucie
Saint Petersburg
Sarasota
Sunrise
Tampa
Titusville

FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

Chicago
Chicago Heights
Cicero
Crystal Lake
Danville
Decatur

IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL

West Palm Beach
Honolulu

FL
HI

DeKalb
Des Plaines

IL
IL
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City
Downers Grove
Elgin
Elk Grove
Elmhurst
Evanston
Galesburg
Glendale Heights
Glenview
Gurnee
Hanover Park
Hoﬀman Estates
Joliet
Lombard
Moline
Mount Prospect
Mundelein
Naperville
Normal
North Chicago
Northbrook
Oak Lawn
Oak Park
Orland Park
Oswego
Palatine
Park Ridge
Pekin

State
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
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City
Springﬁeld
Tinley Park
Urbana
Waukegan
Wheaton
Wheeling
Woodridge
Carmel
Evansville
Fort Wayne
Gary
Indianapolis
Lafayette
Muncie
South Bend
Terre Haute
Kansas City
Lawrence
Topeka
Wichita
Bowling Green
Covington
Lexington
Louisville
Alexandria
Baton Rouge
Boston

State
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
KS
KS
KS
KS
KY
KY
KY
KY
LA
LA
MA

Peoria
Plainﬁeld
Rock Island
Rockford
Romeoville
Saint Charles

IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL

Brockton
Cambridge
Chicopee
Fall River
Fitchburg
Framingham

MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA

Schaumburg
Skokie

IL
IL

Haverhill
Lowell

MA
MA
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City
Medford
New Bedford
Newton
Plymouth
Revere
Somerville
Taunton
Waltham
Watertown
Worcester
Baltimore
Bowie
Frederick
Lewiston
Portland
Ann Arbor
Battle Creek
Bay City
Dearborn
Detroit
East Lansing
Eastpointe
Farmington Hills
Flint
Grand Rapids
Jackson
Kalamazoo

State
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MD
MD
MD
ME
ME
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI

City
Saginaw
Southﬁeld
Sterling Heights
Taylor
Troy
Warren
West Bloomﬁeld
Westland
Wyoming
Blaine
Bloomington
Coon Rapids
Duluth
Mankato
Minneapolis
Moorhead
Rochester
Saint Cloud
Saint Paul
Shakopee
Woodbury
Blue Springs
Columbia
Independence
Kansas City
O'Fallon
Saint Charles

State
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO

Lansing
Lincoln Park
Livonia
Madison Heights
Midland
Novi

MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI

Saint Joseph
Saint Louis
Springﬁeld
University City
Billings
Bozeman

MO
MO
MO
MO
MT
MT

Portage
Roseville

MI
MI

Butte
Great Falls

MT
MT
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City
Helena
Missoula
Bellevue
Grand Island
Lincoln
Omaha
Concord
Dover
Manchester
Nashua
Rochester
Atlantic City
Brick
Camden
Clifton
East Orange
Edison
Elizabeth
Fair Lawn
Fort Lee
Garﬁeld
Hackensack
Hamilton
Hoboken
Jersey City
Kearny
Linden

State
MT
MT
NE
NE
NE
NE
NH
NH
NH
NH
NH
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
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City
Union City
Vineland
West New York
Westﬁeld
Woodbridge
Albuquerque
Hobbs
Las Cruces
Rio Rancho
Santa Fe
Henderson
Las Vegas
North Las Vegas
Reno
Sparks
Albany
Binghamton
Buﬀalo
Cheektowaga
Cicero
Freeport
Hempstead
Irondequoit
Ithaca
Jamestown
Long Beach
Mount Vernon

State
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY

Long Branch
New Brunswick
Passaic
Paterson
Perth Amboy
Plainﬁeld

NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ

New Rochelle
New York
Niagara Falls
Oyster Bay
Poughkeepsie (City)
Poughkeepsie (Town)

NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY

Sayreville
Trenton

NJ
NJ

Riverhead
Rochester

NY
NY
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City
Syracuse
Tonawanda
Troy
Utica
White Plains
Yonkers
Akron
Beavercreek
Boardman
Bowling Green
Brunswick
Canton
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Cleveland Heights
Colerain
Columbus
Cuyahoga Falls
Dayton
Delaware
Dublin
Elyria
Euclid
Fairborn
Fairﬁeld
Findlay
Gahanna

State
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH

City
Lima
Mansﬁeld
Marion
Mason
Massillon
Mentor
Middletown
Newark
North Olmstead
North Ridgeville
North Royalton
Reynoldsburg
Springﬁeld
Stow
Strongsville
Toledo
Upper Arlington
Warren
Westerville
Westlake
Youngstown
Broken Arrow
Edmond
Lawton
Midwest City
Moore
Norman

State
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK

Grove City
Hamilton
Hilliard
Huber Heights
Kent
Kettering

OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH

Oklahoma City
Shawnee
Stillwater
Tulsa
Albany
Beaverton

OK
OK
OK
OK
OR
OR

Lakewood
Lancaster

OH
OH

Bend
Corvallis

OR
OR
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City
Eugene
Grants Pass
Gresham
Hillsboro
Keizer
Lake Oswego
McMinnville
Medford
Oregon City
Portland
Salem
Springﬁeld
Tigard
Allentown
Bethlehem
Erie
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Reading
Scranton
Cranston
Newport
East Providence
Pawtucket
Warwick
Woonsocket
Rapid City

State
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
RI
RI
RI
RI
RI
RI
SD
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City
Brownsville
Cedar Park
Corpus Christi
Dallas
Del Rio
Denton
Edinburg
El Paso
Fort Worth
Galveston
Georgetown
Harlingen
Houston
Laredo
Lufkin
McAllen
McKinney
Mesquite
Pharr
Port Arthur
Round Rock
San Angelo
San Antonio
San Marcos
Temple
Waco
Salt Lake City

State
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT

Sioux Falls
Memphis
Nashville
Abilene
Amarillo
Austin

SD
TN
TN
TX
TX
TX

Burlington
Auburn
Bellevue
Bellingham
Bothell
Bremerton

VT
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA

Baytown
Beaumont

TX
TX

Des Moines
Everett

WA
WA

2019]
City
Federal Way
Issaquah
Kennewick
Kent
Lacey
Lake Stevens
Lakewood
Lynwood
Marysville
Puyallup
Redmond
Renton
Richland
Seattle
Spokane
Tacoma
Vancouver
Walla Walla
Wenatchee
Yakima
Appleton
Brookﬁeld
Fond du Lac
Green Bay
Janesville
Kenosha
Madison
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State
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI

Menomonee Falls
Milwaukee
New Berlin
Oshkosh
Wausau
Wauwatosa

WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI

West Allis

WI
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APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION
In the methodology portion of this Article, I outlined how I “conducted a
preliminary examination of the dataset and surveyed the existing literature
discussed in Part II to identify recurring procedural elements of the
disciplinary appeals process that may reduce democratic accountability or
insulate oﬃcers from accountability.”289 For the purposes of brevity and
readability, I provided only a brief discussion of how I deﬁned the variables
used in this study. In this Methodological Discussion, I will elaborate on the
identiﬁcation and deﬁnition of variables.
First, I included a variable to identify when departments oﬀered
arbitration for oﬃcers appealing disciplinary action. This posed two
methodological challenges. Some union contracts permit arbitration for
some, but not all, disciplinary appeals. Others permit the use of hearing
oﬃcers or other third parties that are the functional equivalent of arbitrators.
Given that a large number of researchers have argued that may serve as a
barrier to oﬃcer accountability, I deﬁned this variable broadly so as to include
any time contract that permits an oﬃcer to appeal any disciplinary action to
an arbitrator, or a comparable third-party.
Second, I included a variable that examined the selection method for
arbitrators. The variable deﬁnition used in this study looks speciﬁcally at
whether the contract provides the police union or police oﬃcer with
signiﬁcant authority to select the identity of the arbitrator or third party that
will hear the appeal. In his prior work in this area, Professor Iris noted:
The selection of who will serve as an arbitrator depends upon the willingness
of both parties to a dispute (or in this study, series of disputes) to accept that
individual as an arbitrator. Those arbitrators whom labor perceives as
strongly pro-management, or vice versa, will over time ﬁnd themselves not
being selected to serve as arbitrators.290

In Chicago and Houston, Iris found that arbitrators frequently split the
diﬀerence between union and management demands during disciplinary
appeals, despite the fact that the two cities used somewhat diﬀerent selection
procedures. Houston used an alternative strike system that permitted both
labor and management to strike potential arbitrators from a panel, while
Chicago used a panel of arbitrators stipulated in their union contract that
289
290

See supra Part III.
Iris, supra note 103, at 240.
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gave them “quasi-permanent status.”291 Iris ultimately found that both
selection processes were associated with similar rates of arbitrators
overturning disciplinary decisions.292 Thus, I included in my deﬁnition of this
variable any selection methodology that allowed oﬃcers to have a role in
selecting an arbitrator that was equal to or greater than management. This
would include the methodologies employed by both Houston and Chicago
from Iris’s prior studies. I did not, however, include in this deﬁnition union
contract provisions that defer to the selection process recommended by
national associations or arbitrators or mediators—even if those associations
recommend a similar approach. It is important to explicitly clarify that this
Article does not take the position that these selection methodologies are, in
and of themselves, problematic. Rather, it makes a narrower argument,
similar to that made by other previous researchers like Professor Iris, that this
sort of a selection methodology may theoretically create unintended
incentives to compromise on disciplinary action because police disciplinary
arbitrators are repeat players—particularly when this variable is present with
other variables considered in this study.
Third, I included a variable to determine whether a police union contract
made arbitration decisions binding on the municipality. I coded an arbitration
procedure as binding if the contract explicitly said as much, or if it was the
ﬁnal step of an appellate procedure, even if some states may permit limited
judicial review of arbitrator’s decisions. But such situations are relatively rare.
Most states make arbitration decisions binding and limit judicial review of
arbitration decisions.293 The Supreme Court has also held that the “refusal of
courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is . . . proper,”294 meaning
that an arbitrator “can be wrong on the facts and wrong on the law and a court
will not overturn the arbitrator’s opinion.”295
Finally, I included a variable to determine the standard of review used
by arbitrators on appeal. The vast majority of contracts simply articulated
the acceptable conditions under which a police department could discipline
an officer (often for “just cause,” “legitimate cause,” or “good cause”). Most
contracts then gave an arbitrator expansive authority to determine whether
a police chief, city manager, or civilian review board had such sufficient
cause to punish an officer, and to decide whether the punishment was
proportional to the alleged offense. I attempted to be as judicious as
possible in coding contracts under this variable. If a union contract placed
Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, supra note 103, at 146.
Id. at 146-47.
Stoughton, supra note 58, at 2210.
Id. (quoting Steelworks v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
Id. (quoting WILL AITCHISON, THE RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 98 (6th
ed. 2009)).
291
292
293
294
295

610

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 545

any limit on an arbitrator’s authority to re-review factual or legal findings
handed down earlier in the disciplinary proceeding, I coded that contract as
not falling into this category. Thus, I tried to only capture in this definition
those contracts that provide arbitrators with something akin to de novo
review authority of disciplinary decisions.

